2. Anwendbarkeit des Grundsatzes des Vertrauensschutzes
Overview
Das Prinzip des Vertrauensschutzes findet auf alle – auch die informellen – verfahrensrechtlichen Schritte Anwendung, die Bedienstete des EPA gegenüber Verfahrensbeteiligten unternehmen (T 160/92, ABl. 1995, 35; s. auch T 343/95, T 460/95 vom 16. Juli 1996 date: 1996-07-16; T 428/98, ABl. 2001, 494).
Es gilt sowohl für Ex-parte- als auch für Inter-partes-Verfahren (T 923/95).
Das EPA muss bei der Beachtung des Grundsatzes des Vertrauensschutzes gegenüber allen Verfahrensbeteiligten – ob nun Anmeldern, Patentinhabern oder Einsprechenden – dieselben Maßstäbe anlegen (T 161/96, ABl. 1999, 331, s. auch J 12/94).
Der Grundsatz des Vertrauensschutzes gilt auch für Handlungen anderer Behörden, die in der internationalen Phase des Euro-PCT-Verfahrens tätig sind, so z. B. für die Handlungen des USPTO in seiner Funktion als Anmeldeamt oder als mit der internationalen vorläufigen Prüfung beauftragte Behörde (J 13/03). Auch auf nationale Behörden erstreckt sich der Vertrauensschutz, wenn sie europäische Patentanmeldungen bearbeiten, die bei ihnen gemäß Art. 75 (1) b) EPÜ eingereicht wurden (J 34/03). Er kann auch in Situationen gelten, in denen zwar keine falsche Auskunft des EPA vorliegt, aber ein Beteiligter infolge der Handlungen eines anderen Beteiligten falsche Auskünfte erhält, was zu demselben Ergebnis führt (s. T 353/18, in der der Beschwerdegegner versehentlich eine Reinschrift und eine mit Anmerkungen versehene Fassung des Anspruchs eingereicht hatte, die nicht übereinstimmten).
Der Grundsatz des Vertrauensschutzes schützt Beteiligte nur vor nachteiligen verfahrensrechtlichen Konsequenzen, die sich aus der Unterlassung von Verfahrensschritten aufgrund von Falschauskünften des EPA ergeben. Er hat keine Auswirkungen auf das materielle Recht und kann nicht patentierbar machen, was auch sonst nicht patentierbar wäre. Dies gilt insbesondere dann, wenn die Auskünfte – auch wenn sie falsch sind – von einer Abteilung des EPA kamen, die für die Prüfung der Patentierbarkeit nicht zuständig war (T 2239/15).
- J 3/24
Zusammenfassung
In J 3/24 the examination and designation fees (due on Friday, 10 February 2023) had been paid too late (on Monday, 13 February 2023). By letter of 12 February 2023, the appellant's representative had requested that the payment be considered as made on time, as he had wrongly assumed that he had given an automatic debit order. On 21 February 2023, a notification of loss of rights had been sent undated, and had been sent again on 7 March 2023 (together, the "Notification") informing the appellant that the application had been deemed to be withdrawn due to the late payment. The Notification indicated as available means of redress a request for further processing under Art. 121 EPC and a request to consider the fee to have been paid on time under Art. 7(3), 7(4) RFees, each within a two-month time limit for filing. No valid request for further processing had been filed during that time.
The appellant argued that the fact that the Receiving Section had not replied to his letter of 12 February 2023 and had wrongly stated that a reply had been given with the Notification constituted a substantial procedural violation. He requested reimbursement of the appeal fee.
The Legal Board did not consider that the requirements in R. 103(1)(a) EPC were met in the present case. It recalled that according to the established case law of the Boards of Appeal, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations (also referred to as the principle of good faith) requires communications addressed to applicants to be clear and unambiguous, i.e. drafted in such a way as to rule out misunderstandings on the part of a reasonable addressee. An applicant must not suffer a disadvantage as a result of having relied on a misleading communication (see G 2/97, J 2/87, J 3/87, J 4/23, T 2092/13). If a communication is not as clear and unambiguous as it should be and misleads a reasonable recipient, this may constitute a substantial procedural violation and entitle the appellant to reimbursement of the appeal fee (see J 3/87). On the other hand, both the EPO and users of the European patent system who are parties to proceedings before it are obliged to act in good faith. The principle of the protection of legitimate expectations does not give carte blanche to the person relying on it (J 4/23). It is the responsibility of users of the European patent system to take all necessary procedural actions to avoid a loss of rights (see G 2/97, R 4/09). It is also inherent in the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations that a person can only successfully invoke an expectation on which they could, on an objective basis, legitimately rely. The erroneous information from the EPO must objectively justify their conduct (see J 4/23; G 2/97). Thus it must be established that, on an objective basis and in the circumstances of the case, it was reasonable for the appellant to have been misled by the information on which they relied (see J 4/23, J 27/92, G 2/97).
The Legal Board acknowledged that the Notification made reference to the late payment but did not expressly address the request of 12 February 2023 for the late payment to be considered as having been made on time. It was therefore not clearly apparent whether the Receiving Section had taken this request into account in the Notification. However, it was not reasonable for the appellant to completely disregard the Notification. Even if the appellant's representative had considered the Notification as having been generated automatically without taking into account the request of 12 February 2023, it was expected that communications from the EPO would be observed. The Notification pointed out the legal remedies available to overcome the loss of rights caused by the late payment and indicated the time limit for filing a request for further processing. Such an official communication could not simply be ignored and set aside. Rather, it was the appellant's own responsibility to enquire about the situation regarding his request before expiry of the triggered time limits to ensure that he did not suffer any loss of rights. The fact that he only contacted the Receiving Section on 1 June 2023 had to be attributed solely to him. The Legal Board reiterated that it was the responsibility of users of the European patent system to take all necessary procedural actions to avoid a loss of rights. This applied all the more in the case at hand as the matter was initially set in motion by an error on the part of the appellant's representative. Moreover, even if a substantial procedural error were to be assumed – which could not be recognised here – reimbursement of the appeal fee would not be equitable within the meaning of R. 103(1)(a) EPC, since the behaviour of the appellant had contributed to the situation.
The request for reimbursement of the appeal fee was refused.