4.5.6 Einreichung neuer Anträge – außergewöhnliche Umstände verneint

Catchword:

Using a passage of the description to interpret a term in the claims does not constitute an "exceptional circumstance" which could justify amendments to the appeal case in the present case (see reasons point 5).

Catchword: 

Since the initial main request, filed for the first time with the statement of grounds of appeal, would not have been admitted under Article 12(4) RPBA 2007, the objections raised by the board in the communication annexed to the summons to oral proceedings against this initial main request are of a hypothetical nature and do not establish exceptional circumstances referred to in Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 which could justify amending the applicant's appeal case.

Catchword:

If, as in the present case, no causality exists between a newly raised aspect and the final conclusion of the Board, the newly raised aspect does not qualify as an exceptional circumstance according to Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 that could justify taking a new request into account. (Reasons 2.5.2)

Catchword:

Modification des moyens selon l'article 13(2) RPCR ; recevabilité de requêtes dans lesquelles certaines revendications indépendantes sont supprimées ; échelonnement des requêtes subsidiaires déposées tout au long de la procédure de recours qui donne lieu à une approche "par tâtonnements" ou une tactique par élimination (tactique du "salami") (voir points 2 et 3 des motifs).

Catchword:
While objections raised by the Board for the first time in a communication under Article 15(1) RPBA 2020 may be considered to give rise to exceptional circumstances within the meaning of Article 13(2) RPBA 2020, and may possibly justify the filing of amendments which specifically respond to the new objections, this does not open the door to additional amendments which are unrelated to the new objections, and for which no exceptional circumstances exist (Reasons, point 3.10).

Zusammenfassung

In T 2124/21 the appellant (applicant) had filed with the statement of grounds of appeal a main request and a first auxiliary request that superseded the sole request subject of the appealed decision. In its communication under Art. 15(1) RPBA, the board informed the appellant of its preliminary intention not to admit these requests, inter alia because no reason had been given why these amendments were filed only on appeal, and because prima facie they contained added subject-matter. In its written reply the appellant withdrew the main request and the first auxiliary request and requested, by reference, the grant of a patent based on the claims of the request subject of the appealed decision.

The board first explained that it was with the main request and first auxiliary request that the resubmitted sole request subject of the appealed decision had to be compared when establishing whether it was an "amendment" to the appeal case. Since the sole request had been abandoned by the statement of grounds of appeal it was not pending anymore when resubmitted. Therefore, it could not be the object of comparison for the purposes of Art. 13(2) RPBA. The board then pointed out that, since claim 1 of each of the main request and the first auxiliary request had an additional feature compared with claim 1 of the sole request subject of the appealed decision, the resubmitted request constituted an amendment to the appeal case within the meaning of Art. 13(2) RPBA.

Regarding the question whether there were exceptional circumstances justified by cogent reasons, the board, citing Art. 12(2) and (3) RPBA, explained that the appellant had made a choice, at the outset of appeal proceedings, not to seek a review of the appealed decision and thereby prevented the board from pursuing the primary object of the appeal proceedings (cf. Art. 12(1)(a) and (b) and (2) RPBA). In the board's view, it could not be expected to begin the judicial review of the appealed decision only at the last stage of the appeal proceedings.

Moreover, the board held that the fact that the amendment in question did not imply a substantial technical change of the claimed subject-matter, was not a circumstance that justified admittance of the sole request. Rather, the only exceptional aspect of the case was the appellant's own choice to avoid the board's review of the appealed decision until the last stage of the appeal proceedings. The objection raised in the preliminary opinion against the then freshly filed main request and first auxiliary request was not an exceptional circumstance.

Since there was no admitted request on file the appeal was dismissed.

Zusammenfassung

In T 1774/21 the appellant had raised a new objection under Art. 123(2) EPC against a feature of the main request (patent as maintained by the opposition division) in its statement of grounds of appeal. The respondent, after first having replied to this allegedly new line of attack with counter-arguments, had requested only in its response to the board's communication under Art. 15(1) RPBA that this line of attack not be admitted into the proceedings pursuant to Art. 12(2), (4), (6) RPBA. The board rejected this request for non-admittance of the objection.

The board first explained that, in the context of the RPBA, the term "requests" included requests for non-admittance of, for example, an objection (contrary to what was suggested in T 1006/21). The general term "requests" was not limited to texts of patent applications or patents. When the RPBA sought to specifically address the issue of amendments of such texts, it expressly referred to "an amendment to a patent application or patent" (see Art. 12(4), fourth sentence, or Art. 13(1), fourth sentence, RPBA). This understanding was also confirmed in the explanatory remarks to Art. 12(2) RPBA (see Supplementary publication 2, OJ EPO 2020, 17). The board concluded that a request for non-admittance of an objection filed after the initial phase of the appeal proceedings constituted an amendment to the party's appeal case.

The respondent also argued that the request for non-admittance of the "new line of attack" should be admitted into the proceedings due to exceptional circumstances, as the appellant had failed to identify the "new line of attack" as an amendment in its statement of grounds of appeal and to give reasons why it had not been raised before the opposition division, contrary to what was required by Art. 12(4) RPBA. The appellant had countered that this objection was not "new" as it had been raised during oral proceedings before the opposition division.

The board held that, even assuming in the respondent's favour that this objection was indeed raised for the first time in the appellant's statement of grounds of appeal, the circumstances of the present case were neither exceptional nor could they justify the filing of the respondent's request for non-admittance only after the board's communication. The board pointed out that it was for the party itself to assess whether there is – in its opinion – an amendment to the other party's case and how to respond to it.

The board rejected the respondent's argument that the board was under the obligation, ex officio, to assess and decide on admittance of the "new line of attack". It explained that a board may indeed examine of its own motion the question of whether an objection was filed "late", since it was not restricted to the facts, evidence and arguments provided by the parties and the relief sought (Art. 114(1), second sentence, EPC). Moreover, Art. 114(2) EPC gave the board the power to "disregard facts or evidence" which are not submitted in due time. However, the fact that Art. 114(2) EPC stated that the EPO (therefore a board of appeal), "may" do so, also meant, that a board was not obliged ex officio to examine whether a submission was made "in due time". In the board's view such an obligation could also not be inferred from the principle of ex officio examination laid down in Art. 114(1), first sentence, EPC. In general, the principle of ex officio examination was to be applied in opposition appeal proceedings in a more restrictive manner (cf. G 9/91, point 18 of the Reasons), which was due to the fact that such proceedings could be regarded as essentially party-driven. In addition, this principle did not go so far as to require a board to examine whether an objection was late filed. Such an understanding of Art. 114(1), first sentence, EPC would be difficult to reconcile with the power given under Art. 114(2) EPC that may or may not be used. The board disagreed with point 27 of the Reasons of decision T 1006/21 in this respect.