2. Applicabilité du principe de protection de la confiance légitime
Pour que le demandeur puisse alléguer qu'il s'était fié à des informations incorrectes et faire valoir le principe du respect de la confiance légitime, il doit être établi que les renseignements erronés émanant de l'OEB ont été directement à l'origine de l'action entreprise par le demandeur et pouvaient objectivement légitimer sa conduite (T 460/95 du 16 juillet 1996 date: 1996-07-16 ; G 2/97, JO 1999, 123 ; J 5/02 ; J 5/07 ; J 10/17). Conformément à la décision J 27/92, il doit être établi qu'en toute objectivité, il est normal que ces renseignements aient induit le requérant en erreur. Une telle appréciation dépend donc des circonstances particulières à chaque espèce.
Dans l'affaire T 321/95, le requérant a fait valoir qu'il était parvenu à un accord verbal avec le premier examinateur. Or, l'existence d'un tel accord ne ressortait pas du dossier. Ainsi, les arguments invoqués par le requérant à l'appui d'une prétendue violation du principe de la bonne foi n'étaient que l'expression de son opinion personnelle et relevaient d'un simple malentendu entre lui et le premier examinateur.
Dans l'affaire T 343/95, la chambre a examiné la teneur d'un entretien téléphonique sur lequel le requérant a fondé ses arguments relatifs à une prétendue violation du principe de la bonne foi. De l'avis de la chambre, il suffisait dans une affaire comme celle en cause, que la chambre détermine la teneur de l'entretien sur la base des probabilités. Les conditions étaient réunies pour l'application du principe de la confiance légitime (voir cependant l'affaire T 188/97, dans laquelle la chambre n'a pu établir les circonstances d'un entretien téléphonique avec un degré de certitude suffisant pour que le principe de protection de la confiance légitime puisse être invoqué).
- J 3/24
Résumé
In J 3/24 the examination and designation fees (due on Friday, 10 February 2023) had been paid too late (on Monday, 13 February 2023). By letter of 12 February 2023, the appellant's representative had requested that the payment be considered as made on time, as he had wrongly assumed that he had given an automatic debit order. On 21 February 2023, a notification of loss of rights had been sent undated, and had been sent again on 7 March 2023 (together, the "Notification") informing the appellant that the application had been deemed to be withdrawn due to the late payment. The Notification indicated as available means of redress a request for further processing under Art. 121 EPC and a request to consider the fee to have been paid on time under Art. 7(3), 7(4) RFees, each within a two-month time limit for filing. No valid request for further processing had been filed during that time.
The appellant argued that the fact that the Receiving Section had not replied to his letter of 12 February 2023 and had wrongly stated that a reply had been given with the Notification constituted a substantial procedural violation. He requested reimbursement of the appeal fee.
The Legal Board did not consider that the requirements in R. 103(1)(a) EPC were met in the present case. It recalled that according to the established case law of the Boards of Appeal, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations (also referred to as the principle of good faith) requires communications addressed to applicants to be clear and unambiguous, i.e. drafted in such a way as to rule out misunderstandings on the part of a reasonable addressee. An applicant must not suffer a disadvantage as a result of having relied on a misleading communication (see G 2/97, J 2/87, J 3/87, J 4/23, T 2092/13). If a communication is not as clear and unambiguous as it should be and misleads a reasonable recipient, this may constitute a substantial procedural violation and entitle the appellant to reimbursement of the appeal fee (see J 3/87). On the other hand, both the EPO and users of the European patent system who are parties to proceedings before it are obliged to act in good faith. The principle of the protection of legitimate expectations does not give carte blanche to the person relying on it (J 4/23). It is the responsibility of users of the European patent system to take all necessary procedural actions to avoid a loss of rights (see G 2/97, R 4/09). It is also inherent in the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations that a person can only successfully invoke an expectation on which they could, on an objective basis, legitimately rely. The erroneous information from the EPO must objectively justify their conduct (see J 4/23; G 2/97). Thus it must be established that, on an objective basis and in the circumstances of the case, it was reasonable for the appellant to have been misled by the information on which they relied (see J 4/23, J 27/92, G 2/97).
The Legal Board acknowledged that the Notification made reference to the late payment but did not expressly address the request of 12 February 2023 for the late payment to be considered as having been made on time. It was therefore not clearly apparent whether the Receiving Section had taken this request into account in the Notification. However, it was not reasonable for the appellant to completely disregard the Notification. Even if the appellant's representative had considered the Notification as having been generated automatically without taking into account the request of 12 February 2023, it was expected that communications from the EPO would be observed. The Notification pointed out the legal remedies available to overcome the loss of rights caused by the late payment and indicated the time limit for filing a request for further processing. Such an official communication could not simply be ignored and set aside. Rather, it was the appellant's own responsibility to enquire about the situation regarding his request before expiry of the triggered time limits to ensure that he did not suffer any loss of rights. The fact that he only contacted the Receiving Section on 1 June 2023 had to be attributed solely to him. The Legal Board reiterated that it was the responsibility of users of the European patent system to take all necessary procedural actions to avoid a loss of rights. This applied all the more in the case at hand as the matter was initially set in motion by an error on the part of the appellant's representative. Moreover, even if a substantial procedural error were to be assumed – which could not be recognised here – reimbursement of the appeal fee would not be equitable within the meaning of R. 103(1)(a) EPC, since the behaviour of the appellant had contributed to the situation.
The request for reimbursement of the appeal fee was refused.