2.2. Lien de causalité entre la violation du droit d'être entendu et la décision finale
Le réexamen de la procédure de première instance par les chambres de recours n'est pas, en principe, limité aux violations "fondamentales" du droit d'être entendu.
Cependant, pour qu'une affaire soit renvoyée à l'instance du premier degré en vertu de l'art. 11 RPCR 2020, il faut que la procédure de première instance soit entachée d'un vice "majeur". De plus, conformément à la règle 103(1)a) CBE, la taxe de recours est remboursée seulement en cas de vice "substantiel" de procédure. Dans l'affaire T 689/05, la chambre a fait le lien entre ces concepts en déclarant que tous les vices de procédure ne constituent pas un vice majeur au sens de l'art. 11 RPCR, mais que seul un vice "substantiel" de procédure est à l'origine d'un vice majeur. Un vice "substantiel" de procédure a été défini dans l'affaire J 7/83 comme une irrégularité objective affectant toute la procédure et, dans l'affaire T 682/91, comme un vice lésant les droits des parties (cf. chapitre V.A.11.6.2 "Le vice de procédure doit être substantiel et avoir une incidence sur l'ensemble de la procédure").
Dans l'affaire T 990/91, le fait de ne pas avoir eu la possibilité de répondre à un argument superflu et secondaire qui avait été avancé par la division d'examen n'a pas pu être considéré comme une violation, et encore moins comme une violation substantielle, du droit d'être entendu.
- J 11/20
Résumé
In J 11/20 the applicant appealed a decision of the Receiving Section refusing their application for the reason that the amended drawings filed by the applicant to remedy formal deficiencies in the application documents were not in agreement with the application documents as originally filed and, despite the invitation by the Receiving Section dated 14 March 2019, the applicant had not corrected this deficiency in due time.
In the statement of grounds of appeal, the appellant submitted that the Receiving Section's communication dated 14 March 2019 had appeared not to have been received by them. They also objected that the EPO had committed a substantial procedural violation by providing information on a procedural non-compliance leading to a severe loss of rights to an assistant by means of an informal telephone call, rather than to the duly appointed representative with an official communication. Informing, in an informal manner, the assistant instead of the duly appointed professional representative, prevented the latter from the possibility to correctly react. The appellant furthermore indicated that these arguments had already been brought to the attention of the Receiving Section with the letter dated 24 October 2019, in reply to the communication under Art. 113(1) EPC. However, they had remained disregarded and the Receiving Section had issued the appealed decision.
In the context of the reimbursement of the appeal fee under R. 103(1)(a) EPC, the Legal Board saw at least a substantial procedural violation in the fact that the Receiving Section had disregarded the objection of lack of receipt of the communication dated 14 March 2019, and had given no consideration to the request for re-establishment of rights. The lack of receipt of this communication had been disputed by the appellant – in addition to the statement of grounds of appeal – before the appealed decision was issued, both in the request for re-establishment of rights and in reply to the communication under Art. 113(1) EPC.
The Legal Board remarked that in the Receiving Section's communication under Art. 113(1) EPC, by reference to the telephone conversation with the assistant of the appellant's representative, the assumption that the communication dated 14 March 2019 had actually been received by the professional representative was taken as a fact. However, there was no trace in the file that the respective telephone note had also been formally notified to the professional representative, giving him the chance to take position on this fact before it being taken into account in the communication under Art. 113(1) EPC.
The Legal Board held that, by simply disregarding the appellant's submissions, the Receiving Section had violated the right to be heard under Art. 113(1) EPC. It is a well-established principle that this right requires not only that an opportunity to present comments is given, but also that these comments are actually taken into due consideration in the decision. The Legal Board concluded that this violation was of a substantial nature since it had affected the reasons on which the appealed decision had been taken, namely the assumption that the communication dated 14 March 2019 had been received by the appellant and thus the deficiencies under R. 58 EPC had not been corrected in due time. The appellant had been given no other choice than filing the appeal. In view of these circumstances, the Legal Board considered that reimbursement of the appeal fee was equitable.
- Compilation 2023 “Abstracts of decisions”