II. DEMANDE DE BREVET ET MODIFICATIONS

Orientierungssatz: 

Funktionelle Merkmale und Ausführbarkeit, siehe Gründe 3.2 bis 3.4 und 3.5.1.

Catchword: 

An amendment to a figure of the patent as granted may extend the protection conferred by the patent even if the claims and the description remain unamended (see point 3 of the Reasons).

Catchword: 

1. On the limits of claim interpretation in the light of the description (see point 13 of the reasons).  2. In application of decision G 3/14, an objection under Article 84 EPC that a claim is not supported by the description is open to examination in opposition or opposition appeal proceedings only when, and then only to the extent that, the lack of support has been introduced by an amendment to the patent. It must thus be accepted that the removal of an inconsistency between the description and a claim amended in opposition or opposition appeal proceedings is not possible when the inconsistency previously existed in the patent as granted (see point 83 of the reasons).

Catchword: 

1. There is no provision stipulating that examples within the meaning of Rule 42(1)(e) EPC should not be in the form of claim-like clauses, i.e. in the form of one or more independent clauses followed by a number of clauses referring to previous clauses, at the end of or in another part of the description. There is no justification for deleting such examples just because they were drafted as claim-like clauses. They are to be treated like any other part of the description and thus, inter alia, must support the claims (Article 84 EPC). (Reasons 3.4 and 3.5)  2. It is a general and overarching objective, and as such also a "requirement" of the Convention, that authorities, courts and the public interpreting the claims at a later stage should, as far as possible, arrive at the same understanding of the claimed subject-matter as the EPO bodies deciding on the patentability of the same subject-matter. The only tool for achieving this objective is the patent specification as the expression of a unitary legal title. The description, as an integral part of the patent specification, should therefore also serve this overriding objective, i.e. it should provide a common understanding and interpretation of the claims. If the description contains subject-matter which manifestly impedes a common understanding, it is legitimate to insist on its removal under Articles 84 and 94(3) EPC and Rules 42, 48 and 71(1) EPC. (Reasons 5.5.3)  3. The board approves the practice where instead of a direct removal, i.e. the deletion of the subject-matter not covered by the claims, a "removal" by way of an appropriate statement is made, leaving the technical disclosure unaffected. (Reasons 5.7.2)  4. A referral to the Enlarged Board of Appeal whose sole purpose is to correct the Guidelines and which is not necessary either for ensuring a uniform case law within the boards or for the board's decision is not admissible. Such a referral could be perceived as an attempt to encroach on the President's powers under Article 10(2)(a) EPC. (Reasons 8.2.2)

Catchword:

1. For the question of whether the applicant is "successor in title" within the meaning of Article 87(1) EPC, it is sufficient for the applicant or patent proprietor to demonstrate that the assignment of the priority right was effective before the subsequent application was filed. The law does not set forth any other condition. In particular, the assignment need not be effective before the filing date of the subsequent application. (see point 2.3). 2. In the context of in-person oral proceedings, a request of a party for a hybrid format to allow the representatives to attend the hearing in person and other attendees to attend remotely should normally be granted only if the participation of the person for whom the access by means of videoconferencing technology has been requested is related to a person whose participation in the oral proceedings is relevant to the case, in particular to the decision to be taken at the oral proceedings (see point 1.).

Catchword:

For assessing an intermediate generalisation in an amended claim for compliance with Article 123(2) EPC it has to be established whether, because of this generalisation, the subject-matter of the claim extends beyond what was, be it explicitly or implicitly, directly and unambiguously disclosed to the person skilled in the art using common general knowledge in the application as filed. This is the "gold" standard for assessing any amendment for its compliance with Article 123(2) EPC (G 2/10, point 4.3 of the Reasons). If an amended claim comprises only some features of an originally disclosed combination and the features left out of the claim were understood, by the person skilled in the art, to be inextricably linked to the claimed ones, the claim includes subject-matter extending beyond the application as filed. This is the case if the person skilled in the art would have regarded the omitted features to be necessary for achieving the effect associated with the added features. In such a situation the amended claim conveys the technical teaching that the effect can be obtained with the claimed features alone, which is in contrast with and extends beyond the original disclosure that the whole combination of features was needed. The criteria for assessing the validity of a priority for the subject-matter of a claim as set out in G 2/98, no matter whether or not the claim includes intermediate generalisations, correspond to the "gold" standard for assessing any amendment for its compliance with Article 123(2) EPC. In view of Article 88(4) EPC, it is not required that this subject-matter be disclosed in the form of a claim or in the form of an embodiment or example specified in the description of the application from which the priority is claimed. In the passage in point 4 of the Reasons of G 2/98 these items, as derived from the expression "in particular", are simply listed as exemplary parts of the application documents. (Reasons, points 2.4 and 3.2)

Catchword: 

With regard to the question of compatibility of certain principles of claim interpretation for the purposes of considering novelty or inventive step with Article 69 EPC, reference is made to Reasons 1.1.11 to 1.1.16.  The principle of primacy of the claims seems to exclude the use of the description and drawings for limiting the claims if an interpretation of the claim in the light of common general knowledge already leads to a technically meaningful result. Similarly, the principle, established by case law, according to which "limiting features which are only present in the description and not in the claim cannot be read into a patent claim" is also fully compatible with Article 69 EPC and Article 1 of the Protocol.

Catchword:

1. Entspricht der Antrag, der der Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung zugrunde liegt, zum Zeitpunkt der Entscheidung nicht dem Willen einer Partei, so ist diese Partei beschwert und ihre Beschwerde gegen die Entscheidung zulässig (Punkt 1.1 der Entscheidungsgründe).  2. Die Kammer sieht es als erwiesen an, dass die Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung nicht auf der beabsichtigten Fassung des Hilfsantrags beruht, die in der mündlichen Verhandlung erörtert wurde. Im vorliegenden Fall hat die Einspruchsabteilung entweder über den falschen Antrag entschieden, der nicht dem Tenor der Entscheidung entspricht, oder aber über einen Antrag, zu dem die Parteien nicht gehört wurden. Beides stellt einen schwerwiegenden Verfahrensmangel dar, und daher ist die Entscheidung aufzuheben (Punkte 3.4 - 3.6 der Entscheidungsgründe).  3. Ein Fehler in einem während der mündlichen Verhandlung eingereichten Anspruchssatz, der Teil einer in der mündlichen Verhandlung verkündeten Entscheidung geworden ist, ist weder einer späteren Korrektur über Regel 140 EPÜ zugänglich, noch über Regel 139 EPÜ, sofern es ihm an der Offensichtlichkeit mangelt (Punkte 5.1 - 5.5 der Entscheidungsgründe).

Catchword: 

The mere fact that features are described in the application as filed in terms of lists of more or less converging alternatives does not give the proprietor a "carte blanche" for freely combining features selected from a first list with features selected from a second list disclosed in the application as filed. Any such amendment will only be allowable under Article 123(2) EPC if it complies with the "gold standard" defined in decision G 2/10 (reasons 2.18 of the present decision).

Catchword:

Any unclarity that may arise from an ambiguity in an application as filed is to the detriment of a patent proprietor, who is ultimately responsible for the drafting of the application as filed and its claims. The fact that a feature in the application as filed is unclear cannot therefore justify or excuse the complete deletion of the unclear feature or its replacement by another feature if this results in an extension beyond the content of the application as filed. What prompted a patent proprietor to make a particular amendment to the claims cannot have any influence on the outcome of the assessment of the ground for opposition under Article 100(c) EPC (point 8 of the Reasons).

Catchword:

The burden of proof regarding the facts, arguments and evidence on the substance (which initially lies with the opponent) does not shift to the proprietor just because the patent has been revoked due to an alleged insufficient disclosure. It is down to the patent proprietor to substantiate on appeal why that decision is wrong. The burden of proof on the substance (and in consequence the benefit of the doubt), however, is only shifted when the opposition division's assessment that the presented facts, arguments and evidence were sufficient to discharge the opponent's burden of proof turns out to be correct. (See item 1. of the grounds)

Catchword: Im vorliegenden Fall konnte von der Beschwerdeführerin nicht erwartet werden, auf einen einzelnen Aspekt einer in ihrer Gesamtheit nicht überzeugenden Argumentationslinie in der angefochtenen Entscheidung der Prüfungsabteilung mit auf diesen Aspekt gerichteten Änderungen, die alle Einwände der Beschwerdekammer ausräumen, bereits bei Einlegen der Beschwerde zu reagieren.

Catchword: 

Following the explicit reference in G 2/10 to the applicability of the existing jurisprudence regarding the singling out of compounds or sub-classes of compounds or other so-called intermediate generalisations not specifically mentioned nor implicitly disclosed in the application as filed (see G 2/10, section 4.5.4), the Board understands the notion of  "the remaining generic group of compounds differing from the original group only by its smaller size" versus "singling out an hitherto not specifically mentioned sub-class of compounds" and the notion of  "mere restriction of the required protection" versus "generating another invention" or "suitable to provide a technical contribution to the originally disclosed subject-matter"  as developed in the jurisprudence (see in section Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, supra, section II.E.1.6.3) not as modifications of the "gold standard" for the assessment of amendments in the form of additional or alternative criteria, but rather as considerations which may arise from the application of this standard when assessing amendments by deletion of options from multiple lists and which may affirm the result of such assessment. In particular, the observation that a deletion of options from multiple lists is an amendment suitable to provide a technical contribution to the originally disclosed subject-matter, can be used to support the assessment that this amendment is not in compliance with the "gold standard".

Catchword: 

In accordance with the jurisprudence exemplified by T 609/02 (see section 9), the suitability of the claimed composition for the defined therapeutic use needs to be disclosed in the patent, "unless this is already known". This jurisprudence confirms in the Boards view that the disclosed utility of the claimed composition may also derive its credibility from the prior art, even if this prior art does not represent common general knowledge (see point 3.3).

Catchword: 

1. If the deletion of dependent claims after notification of a summons to oral proceedings enhances procedural economy by clearly overcoming existing objections without giving rise to any new issues this might constitute cogent reasons justifying exceptional circumstances in the sense of Article 13(2) RPBA 2020. 

2. For a first medical use of a substance or composition according to Article 54(4) EPC to be sufficiently disclosed it is not required to show the suitability for each and every disease, but it usually suffices to show that at least one medical use is credibly achieved.

Catchword:

The description of a drawing may be inextricably linked to the specific disclosure of this drawing. If a feature in the description of the drawing is extracted from the very specific context of the drawing in order to be included in a claim, the specific disclosure of the drawing must be taken into account. If there is no literal support for this specific disclosure in the application as filed which could be used for supplementing the feature used for amending the claim, it may not be possible to avoid an unallowable intermediate generalisation. This may in particular occur if a feature from a specific and detailed embodiment is placed in the context of a schematic drawing. This may lead to a trap-like situation. (Reasons, 2.8.4 and 2.9)

Catchword:

Zur Ausführbarkeit der beanspruchten Erfindung "im gesamten beanspruchten Bereich": siehe Punkt 3 der Entscheidungsgründe.

Catchword: 

In view of the principles of multiple priorities and partial priority: undisclosed disclaimer based on a disclosure in an earlier application by the same applicant not allowed.

Catchword: 

As to claim construction, see point 2.7 of the Reasons.

Catchword:

Wenngleich sich ein Patentanspruch nicht an einen Linguisten, sondern an die Fachperson richtet, müssen bei der Bestimmung des - stets sprachlich angegebenen - technischen Anspruchsgegenstands aus fachmännischer Perspektive die geltenden Regeln der Sprachlehre ebenfalls berücksichtigt werden (Nr. 4.6 der Gründe).

Exergue:

1) Le mémoire exposant les motifs du recours d'un requérant (opposant) doit comprendre l'ensemble des moyens couvrant toutes les requêtes pendantes devant la division d'opposition, y compris celles qui n'ont pas été considérées dans la décision contestée. Faute de quoi, le réquérant s'expose à ce que des moyens déposés après le mémoire exposant les motifs du recours et visant des requêtes subsidiaires pendantes devant la division d'opposition et déposées en réponse au mémoire de recours par le propriétaire du brevet soit écartés de la procédure (point 3 des motifs). 2) Lorsqu'un propriétaire de brevet modifie une revendication de produit en énonçant que le produit est destiné à une utilisation particulière, alors c'est à lui qu'appartient la charge de la preuve de démontrer que les produits de l'état de la technique cités contre la nouveauté et satisfaisant à toutes les autres caractéristiques de la revendication sont inaptes à l'utilisation en question (point 9 des motifs). 3) Une formulation dite « en cascade » de caractéristiques est susceptible d'entraîner une ambiguïté de la revendication. Lorsqu'une revendication est définie comme incluant une classe générique de composés présents dans une gamme pondérale et que la revendication est modifiée « en cascade » en indiquant que la classe générique est un composé spécifique, alors la gamme pondérale s'applique à ce composé spécifique, et non plus à la classe générique (point 11 des motifs). La portée de la revendication ne doit pas être interprétée sur la base d'une prétendue intention du rédacteur de la revendication, mais doit être appréciée sur la base de ses caractéristiques. L'ambiguïté d'une formulation « en cascade » ne peut pas être utilisée pour interpréter la revendication comme excluant tous les composés de la classe générique autres que ceux mentionnés ou en imposant une limitation pondérale à l'ensemble de la classe générique (point 12 des motifs)(T0999/10 - non suivi

Catchword:

In general, an auxiliary request which is directed to a combination of granted dependent claims as new independent claim, and filed after the statement of grounds or the reply thereto, will be an amendment of the party's appeal case within the meaning of Article 13 RPBA 2020. See reasons 9. A skilled person assessing the contents of the original application documents uses his technical skill. If they recognise that certain elements of the original application documents are essential for achieving a technical effect then adding that technical effect to a claim without also adding the essential elements can create fresh subject-matter even if the essential elements are originally portrayed as being optional. See reasons 3.6.3.

Catchword: 

Reasons 3.6. In claimed inventions that do not involve a range of parameter values or compositions but are directed at a concept expressed in terms of generic structural or functional features of an apparatus or of a method, it is not enough to demonstrate insufficiency to conceive of an example that falls within the terms of the claim that does not work because it does not achieve the claimed effect fully or at all so that therefore the invention would not be sufficiently disclosed across the entire breadth of the claim.

Catchword: 

Under Article 69(1) EPC the description and the drawings can only be used for interpreting features which are already present in the claims, but not for adding further – positive or negative - claim features or for replacing existing claim features by others (Reasons 2.15). The application as filed usually cannot provide guidance for interpreting the claims of the patent as granted (Reasons 2.16). A board of appeal is not limited to the claim interpretations advanced by the parties but may also adopt a claim interpretation of its own (Reasons 3.4.2). Relying on documentary evidence is not a precondition for the adoption of a certain claim interpretation by a board of appeal (Reasons 3.4.3).

Catchword:

To assess whether an amended patent claim contains added subject-matter under Article 123(2) EPC, the claimed subject-matter must first be determined by interpreting the claim from the perspective of the person skilled in the art. In a second step, it must be assessed whether that subject-matter is disclosed in the application as filed (Reasons 1.3.8 to 1.3.10).

Catchword:

1. The provisions in Article 84 EPC and Rules 42 and 43 EPC provide an adequate legal basis for claim interpretation when assessing patentability. In particular, the requirement that the claims shall be "supported by the description" in Article 84 EPC, 2nd sentence, indicates that the description may be relied upon as an aid or support for understanding the subject-matter of the claims. 2. However, as implicitly derivable from this provision, the support of the description for interpreting the claims should only be resorted to in the exceptional cases where the subject-matter of the invention and/or its technical context needs to be clarified, and may only be applicable when the invention in the description corresponds to the invention as claimed. 3. The support of the description should, in any case, not be used for restricting or modifying the subject-matter of the invention beyond what a person skilled in the art would understand when reading the wording of the claims within the relevant technical context.

Catchword:

1. If a request is not admitted because earlier objections are not overcome, Rule 111(2) EPC requires that these earlier objections be made explicit in the decision (see reasons 3).

2. Non-convergence of requests is, on its own, not a sufficient reason for non-admittance. It must be reasoned that and why non-convergent requests affect procedural economy in view of the particular circumstances of the case (see reasons 4).

3. The purpose of the claims to define the matter for which protection is sought (Article 84 EPC) imparts requirements on the application as a whole, in addition to the express requirements that the claims be clear, concise and supported by the description. The Board deems it to be an elementary requirement of a patent as a legal title that its extent of protection can be determined precisely. Whether this is the case for a specific patent application (or an amended patent) can only be decided with due consideration of the description. Claims and description do not precisely define the matter for which protection is sought if they contradict each other (see reasons 27 to 34).

Catchword: 

An inescapable trap (Article 123(2) and (3) EPC) intrinsically precludes the admission of new requests under Articles 13(1) and (2) RPBA 2020, as the requirements of Article 123(2) and (3) EPC cannot both be satisfied (Reasons 4.3).

Catchword: 

The requirement that the claims are to be supported by the description under Article 84, second sentence, EPC does not necessarily mean that all the "embodiments" of the description of a patent application have to be covered by the (independent) claims, i.e. that all the embodiments must fall within the scope of those claims (see point 6.2.2 of the Reasons).

Catchword:

Ausführbarkeit der Erfindung "über den gesamten beanspruchten Bereich" auf dem Gebiet der Mechanik (siehe Punkt 2.1.3 der Entscheidungsgründe)

Exergue : 

Interprétation des revendications de procédé comportant des caractéristiques de type produit (que l'on pourrait qualifier de revendications « process-by-product ») (voir le point 1.1.4 des motifs)

Catchword: 

The normal rule of claim construction of reading a feature specified in a claim in its broadest technically meaningful sense corresponds to determining the broadest scope encompassed by the subject-matter being claimed according to a technically sensible reading. In the case of a feature defined in a positive manner, which imposes the presence of a specific element, this is effectively achieved by giving to the element in question its broadest technically sensible meaning. However, for a feature defined in a negative manner, which excludes the presence of a specific element, the broadest scope of the claim corresponds to the narrowest (i.e. most limited) technically sensible definition of the element to be excluded. (Reasons, point 5.7)

Catchword: 

1.) Article 69 EPC in conjunction with Article 1 of the Protocol thereto can and should be relied on when interpreting claims and determining the claimed subject-matter in proceedings before the EPO, including for the purpose of assessing compliance with Article 123(2) EPC (Reasons 3.1-3.15).  2.) Although Article 69(1), second sentence, EPC requires that generally account be taken of the description and the drawings when interpreting a claim, the primacy of the claims according to Article 69(1), first sentence, EPC limits the extent to which the meaning of a certain claim feature may be affected by the description and the drawings (Reasons 3.16-3.16.2).  3.) Claim interpretation is overall a question of law which must as such ultimately be answered by the deciding body, and not by linguistic or technical experts. It does, however, involve the appraisal of linguistic and technical facts which may be supported by evidence submitted by the parties (Reasons 3.17).

Catchword: 

On the application of Rule 80 EPC and the findings of the Enlarged Board of Appeal in G 3/14 in case of an alleged discrepancy between the description and a feature stemming from a granted claim, see point 4.

Catchword:

If the patent proprietor introduces various differences between the definition of a certain compound in a granted claim and that in the priority application and if despite these differences, the patent proprietor, in arguing that the effective date of the subject-matter of the granted claim is the claimed priority date, asserts that the compound of the granted claim is the same as that disclosed in the priority application, it is the patent proprietor who bears the burden of proving this assertion (point 2.13 of the reasons).

Catchword: 

1. Mere inconsistencies among the indications in the request for grant of a European patent (EPO Form 1001), and between some of them and the originally filed application documents, are not sufficient to prove an alleged obvious error or the obviousness of a correction offered under Rule 139 EPC. 

2. The ban on corrections under Rule 139 EPC by replacement of at least the complete description is categorical.

Catchword:

I. The European Patent Office is competent to assess whether a party is entitled to claim priority under Article 87(1) EPC. There is a rebuttable presumption under the autonomous law of the EPC that the applicant claiming priority in accordance with Article 88(1) EPC and the corresponding Implementing Regulations is entitled to claim priority. II. The rebuttable presumption also applies in situations where the European patent application derives from a PCT application and/or where the priority applicant(s) are not identical with the subsequent applicant(s). In a situation where a PCT application is jointly filed by parties A and B, (i) designating party A for one or more designated States and party B for one or more other designated States, and (ii) claiming priority from an earlier patent application designating party A as the applicant, the joint filing implies an agreement between parties A and B allowing party B to rely on the priority, unless there are substantial factual indications to the contrary. 

Catchword:

I. The European Patent Office is competent to assess whether a party is entitled to claim priority under Article 87(1) EPC. There is a rebuttable presumption under the autonomous law of the EPC that the applicant claiming priority in accordance with Article 88(1) EPC and the corresponding Implementing Regulations is entitled to claim priority. II. The rebuttable presumption also applies in situations where the European patent application derives from a PCT application and/or where the priority applicant(s) are not identical with the subsequent applicant(s). In a situation where a PCT application is jointly filed by parties A and B, (i) designating party A for one or more designated States and party B for one or more other designated States, and (ii) claiming priority from an earlier patent application designating party A as the applicant, the joint filing implies an agreement between parties A and B allowing party B to rely on the priority, unless there are substantial factual indications to the contrary.

Headnote: 

I. Evidence submitted by a patent applicant or proprietor to prove a technical effect relied upon for acknowledgement of inventive step of the claimed subject-matter may not be disregarded solely on the ground that such evidence, on which the effect rests, had not been public before the filing date of the patent in suit and was filed after that date. 

II. A patent applicant or proprietor may rely upon a technical effect for inventive step if the skilled person, having the common general knowledge in mind, and based on the application as originally filed, would derive said effect as being encompassed by the technical teaching and embodied by the same originally disclosed invention.

Résumé

In T 177/22 the board stated that in order to assess whether the claimed invention is sufficiently disclosed or is novel or inventive, the claimed invention must – to the extent to which this is decisive for the outcome of the case – first be determined by interpreting the claim from the perspective of the person skilled in the art (see T 367/20). When doing this, a board of appeal is not limited to the claim interpretations advanced by the parties but may also adopt a claim interpretation of its own (T 450/20, T 1537/21).

According to the board, the relevant feature of claim 1 as granted was to be interpreted not only in the context of the other features in that claim but also in the context of the description as granted (for recent case law on this matter see T 367/20, referring to the principles of claim interpretation as set out in Art. 69 EPC and Art. 1 of the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 EPC; T 447/22, referring to the general principle under the EPC that claims can be interpreted only in context, which includes the description and the drawings; T 1473/19, referring to G 2/88, applying Art. 69 EPC and the Protocol for interpreting "the technical features of the claim" when assessing extension of the scope of protection under Art. 123(3) EPC; G 6/88 (taken on the same day as G 2/88), where the Enlarged Board (directly) applied Art. 69 EPC and the Protocol "to construe the claim in order to determine its technical features" when assessing novelty; compare also Court of Appeal of the Unified Patent Court, UPC_CoA_335/2023, Grounds 4.d)aa), referring to Art. 69 EPC and the Protocol as well as to G 2/88, and stating that the principles for the interpretation of a patent claim apply equally to the assessment of the infringement and the validity of a European patent; as to the harmonised approach on claim interpretation introduced by the EPC see further G 6/88, referring to Art. 69 EPC and the Protocol on its interpretation as "a mechanism for harmonisation" which provides a "method of interpretation of claims of European patents throughout their life"; T 1473/19, referring to the legitimate interests of the users of the European patent system in a common approach to claim interpretation; T 367/20 and T 438/22, referring to the overarching objective under the EPC that authorities, courts and the public interpreting the claims should, as far as possible, arrive at the same understanding of the claimed subject-matter as the EPO bodies deciding on its patentability; as to the primacy of the claims under Art. 69 EPC and the Protocol see T 1473/19; in regard to the latter compare also Court of Appeal of the Unified Patent Court, UPC_CoA_335/2023, Grounds 4.d)aa), referring to the patent claim as not only the starting point, but the decisive basis for determining its subject-matter and scope of protection).

The board noted that the fact that the patent specification disclosed embodiments which were not encompassed by claim 1 did not result in an insufficient disclosure but in a lack of support by the description under Art. 84 EPC. However, the requirements of Art. 84 EPC play no role in opposition proceedings where the proprietor seeks to have the patent as granted upheld (G 3/14, point 55 of the Reasons).

The respondent (opponent) submitted that a different, broader, claim interpretation had to be adopted for the assessment of novelty and inventive step than for the assessment of sufficiency of disclosure. The board disagreed and stated that the "invention" within the meaning of Art. 54(1) EPC, the "invention" within the meaning of Art. 56 EPC and the "invention" within the meaning of Art. 100(b) EPC (and Art. 83 EPC) all refer to the claimed subject-matter (see T 1473/19 and T 92/21), and a given patent claim's subject-matter must be interpreted and determined in a uniform and consistent manner (see T 1473/19). This excluded interpreting the same claim differently when assessing sufficiency of disclosure on the one hand, and when assessing novelty and inventive step on the other hand. It also presupposed that the same principles of claim interpretation must be applied when assessing compliance with any of these requirements under the EPC.

The board further held that a patent claim must be construed in an objective manner (see T 518/00, referring to the description and the drawings as an aid to interpretation). This prohibited adopting a certain claim interpretation – be it narrow or broad – only because it was, under a certain ground of opposition (or, for that matter, under a certain ground for revocation or in infringement proceedings), (more) detrimental or beneficial to one of the parties.

Résumé

In T 147/22 the respondent (opponent) raised several clarity objections, which were mainly directed to the expression "consisting essentially of" and to the fact that the ingredients cited in claim 1 were associated with a function.

On the first aspect, the board noted that the expression "consisting essentially of" limited the ingredients in the composition of claim 1 to those defined in components (a) to (d), although further non-active ingredients could be present provided they did not materially affect the chemical stability of TAS-102. The respondent had argued that the expression "consisting essentially of" rendered claim 1 unclear because the skilled person would not know which were the compounds that did not impair the stability of TAS-102 in the composition, and the patent did not contain any information in that respect. According to the board, however, the nature and amount of those additional ingredients was strongly limited by the condition that they must not impair TAS-102 stability. Furthermore, the skilled person confronted with a composition containing components (a) to (d) and additional ingredients could easily determine whether or not the additional ingredients impair TAS-102 stability. Testing the chemical stability of active compounds in a composition was standard practice in the field of pharmaceutical formulations. Such tests were illustrated in Test Examples 1 to 5 of the patent for the particular case of TAS-102. Therefore, the skilled person could easily determine by standard comparative tests whether or not a given composition consisted essentially of components (a) to (d).

With regard to the functional definition of the ingredients in claim 1, the board held that the criterion for assessing whether a compound had the function assigned to it was the function (or functions) that the skilled person would assign to that compound in the context of a given formulation. Contrary to the respondent's view, the formulator's intention was irrelevant in that respect. It was undisputed that the functional features "excipient", "disintegrating agent", "binder", "lubricant", "flavouring agent", "colourant" and "taste-masking agent" were standard in the technical field of pharmaceutical formulations. The skilled person would have no difficulty in determining whether a given formulation ingredient fulfils one or more of these functions on the basis of common general knowledge. These were functional features which were generally allowed if the invention could not be defined more precisely without unduly restricting the scope of the invention. Furthermore, in the present case, the main ingredients were not solely defined by functional features. They were further limited by structural features: for instance, the excipient according to component (b) was selected from lactose, sucrose, mannitol and erythritol. In view of common general knowledge and the structural limitations of the functional features, the board considered that the definition of the ingredients in claim 1 was not unclear.

The respondent's objection was based on the possibility that an ingredient fulfilled more than one function and, depending on its function, the amount of the compound in the composition could vary. For instance, polyvinyl alcohol was generally known to be a binder and a lubricant. If it was considered a binder, it could be present in an amount of 0.001 to 5% by mass while it could not be present if it was considered a lubricant.

The board disagreed. The fact that polyvinyl alcohol was known to be a binder and a lubricant did not render the claim unclear. If polyvinyl alcohol was present in the composition, it necessarily played the role of a binder, even if it also fulfilled the function of a lubricant. Therefore, it should be counted as a binder that may be present in an amount of 0.001 to 5% by mass in the composition. Considering arbitrarily that polyvinyl alcohol could function exclusively as a lubricant and that therefore its presence would render the composition different from the one in claim 1 would be unrealistic. Certainly this was not how the skilled person would read the claim.

Moreover, the board stated that the fact that "excipient" was a very broad term did not mean that it was unclear. "Excipient" was a standard term in pharmaceutical formulations.

Résumé

In T 1526/22 the application related to a method (and a corresponding apparatus) for estimating a "state" of an ego vehicle, for use in a motor vehicle driver assistance system for the ego vehicle. The examining division had objected that claims 1 and 12 failed to meet the requirements of Art. 84 EPC for two reasons:

(1) the wording "the first state and the second state each include at least one local object attribute describing a local object located in the vicinity of the ego vehicle, wherein the local object is a local vehicle" did not allow to unambiguously derive the meaning of an attribute describing a local object, for example whether it was limited or not to a colour of said local vehicle; and

(2) the wording "for a motor vehicle driver assistance for an ego vehicle" suggested that an effect supporting motor vehicle assistance was to be produced, which was however not apparent from the wording of the claim.

In both cases, it was said that claims 1 and 12 had to be limited in order for the claimed subject-matter to be in agreement with the effect and problem argued by the appellant. Reference was made in that respect to the Guidelines F-IV, 4.5.1.

As regards (1) the board considered the recited feature to be broad but not unclear: "at least one local object attribute" could be any attribute of the local vehicle that was suitable for use by a driver assistance system. It could be, for instance, the local vehicle's position or velocity or even its colour (e.g. as it could be relevant for a classification of that vehicle).

As regards (2) the board interpreted the wording of claim 1 "an apparatus for a motor vehicle driver assistance system for an ego vehicle" as meaning an apparatus suitable for a motor vehicle driver assistance system for an ego vehicle, as is usual for a purpose feature in an apparatus claim in the form "apparatus for ...". Claim 1 did not require the claimed apparatus to be configured to provide the output of the state estimator as input to a driver assistance system.

Claim 12 was directed to "a method for estimating a state of an ego vehicle, the method being implemented on a compute module, the state being for use in a motor vehicle driver assistance system for the ego vehicle". The board noted that last statement appeared to define an intended use of the calculated state obtained by the claimed method. This was not a purpose feature of the kind "method for...", which could in certain circumstances be considered to imply a corresponding method step, but rather of the kind "data for...". The claim did not specify any method step in which the calculated state would be actually used for that purpose, nor did the claim comprise any other feature that would establish that said use was part of the claimed method, be it explicitly or implicitly. The board understood this feature as merely requiring the calculated state to be suitable for use in a motor vehicle driver assistance system for the ego vehicle, in which case there would be no clarity problem. However, in view of the other objections, this issue was left open.

Moreover, the board observed that the examining division had not referred to any specific passage of the description in support of its objections. Hence, the passage of the Guidelines F-IV, 4.5.1 "Objections arising from missing essential features", cited by the examining division, did not support the raised objections.

However, the board raised further objections and concluded that claims 1 and 12 lacked clarity under Art. 84 EPC. In particular, the board noted that according to the third and fourth embodiments, reflected in dependent claim 5, the prediction model and the update model were "combined into a combined ANN". In these embodiments, the combined ANN carried out an estimation of the second state taking as input the first state and the measurements of the second state but without necessarily performing separate prediction and update calculations, as suggested by claim 1. This cast doubt as to how the features of claim 1 related to the prediction and update elements were to be interpreted, rendering claim 1 unclear. Similar considerations applied to claim 12.

Résumé

In T 1084/22 the patent concerned insulating glazing units, which typically consist of two glass sheets separated by a perimeter spacer. Specifically, it related to a method for creating such units. This involved providing a spacer body with adhesive on both sides in a storage container. Claim 1 was amended during examination to specify that the adhesive was a pressure sensitive adhesive.

The board was not convinced by the argument put forward by the appellant (patent proprietor) which aimed to show that the feature was implicitly derivable from the description.

The board found that the second line of argument submitted by the appellant was not convincing either. The appellant had submitted that the reference in the description of the application as filed to HBP8 (a US patent), which mentioned pressure sensitive adhesives, also provided an original basis for the added feature.

The board explained that the appealed decision referred to conditions developed in the case law for being able to incorporate features from a cross-referenced document (see in particular T 689/90). Thus, only under particular conditions would adding features from a cross-referenced document to a claim not be contrary to Art. 123(2) EPC, namely if (a) the description of the invention as filed left the skilled reader in no doubt that protection was sought or may be sought for those features; (b) that they implicitly clearly belonged to the description of the invention contained in the application as filed and thus to the content of the application as filed; and (c) that they were precisely defined and identifiable within the total technical information contained in the reference document.

The board viewed these conditions, along with alternative or reformulated criteria found in the cases cited in Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 10^th ed. 2022, II.E.1.2.4, as different applications of the "gold standard". While different tests had been developed, they could only assist in determining whether an amendment complied with Art. 123(2) EPC, but did not replace the "gold standard" and should not lead to a different result. Thus, the board considered it sufficient and appropriate to apply the "gold standard" principle to this case.

In a case of incorporating features from a cross-d document, the "gold standard" essentially required that the skilled reader had to be able to directly and unambiguously derive which subject-matter of the incorporated document was part of the original application. In other words, which features of the application were to be taken from the referenced document.

Therefore, the question that the board needed to answer was whether, in the absence of any hindsight or knowledge of the amended claim, the skilled person reading the original documents would directly and unambiguously derive from the cross-reference to HBP8 that the adhesive's pressure sensitive nature was a feature to be incorporated from HBP8 into the original application. This required that when the skilled reader of the application as filed consulted HPB8 as instructed it was immediately clear to them that it was that feature and that feature alone that was to be included. If that feature was disclosed in a certain technical context in the cross-referenced document, then, applying the same standard as for intermediate generalisations, isolation of the feature was justified only in the absence of any clearly recognisable functional or structural relationship.

In the board's view it was neither immediately clear to the skilled person from the cross-reference to HBP8 that it was the feature of the adhesive being pressure sensitive that was to be included, nor that that feature could be taken out of its context in HPB8.

Hence, the board concluded that the amendment to claim 1 specifying the adhesive as "pressure sensitive" extended the patent's subject matter beyond the content of the original application.

Résumé

In T 1208/21 the board rejected the respondent's (patent proprietor's) approach of a limited interpretation of the expression "gas turbine blade" in claim 1 in the light of the description.

The board held that according to the commonly accepted approach on claim interpretation by the boards of appeal, when assessing inter alia the patentability requirements of Art. 54 and 56 EPC a claim which is clear by itself should be interpreted as broadly as technically reasonable in the relevant technical field (see T 1628/21, T 447/22). As to the extent to which the description and the figures of the patent have to be taken into account for interpreting the wording of a claim, the board agreed with the principles set out in decisions T 1628/21 and T 1473/19.

Moreover, the board noted that the description of the patent in suit did not lead to a different conclusion either. The description of the patent as granted stated: "Generally, the gas turbine blade according to the present invention is not restricted to a gas turbine: rotor blades or guide vanes of a turbo-machinery fall legally under the present invention". Correspondingly, granted claim 13 was directed to a blade suitable for use as a rotor blade or guide vane for turbo-machinery. This confirmed that the patent itself considered the term "blade" in claim 1 to cover rotating and stationary blades (vanes) as well as their use in turbo-machinery in general, thus not limited to the turbine section of a gas turbine.

Although the description and the claims had been amended in auxiliary request 3 by deleting these statements of the granted patent, such an amendment of the description did not constitute a limitation of the claimed subject-matter. The board stated that, in analogy to the situation underlying decision T 454/89, in which it was held that a lack of clarity in a claim could not be cured by relying on Art. 69 EPC as a replacement for the Art. 84 requirements, i.e. as a substitute for an amendment which would be necessary to remedy a lack of clarity, also in the context of the requirements of Art. 54 and 56 EPC, a technically reasonable and not illogical understanding of the claim wording could not be restricted by reference or an amendment to the description. In such a situation, it would, rather, be the claim wording that would require amendment (see T 1628/21).

Résumé

In T 2643/16 of 3 June 2024, the board had to decide whether the applicant was entitled to claim priority from previous applications D1 and D2 when filing the application on which the patent in suit was granted. This was a final decision following interlocutory decision T 2643/16 of 16 February 2023.

The board recalled that, in accordance with the order of G 1/22 and G 2/22, it was competent to assess whether a party was entitled to claim priority under Art. 87(1) EPC. In this context, there was a rebuttable presumption that the applicant claiming priority in accordance with Art. 88(1) EPC and the corresponding Implementing Regulations was entitled to claim priority. This rebuttable presumption also applied in situations such as the one in hand, in which the European patent application derived from a PCT application and the priority applicants differed from the subsequent applicant.

According to the board, the opponents did not rebut the presumption that the applicant was entitled to claim the priority from applications D1 and D2. The applicant was therefore entitled to claim priority from such applications. Consequently, documents D6, D8 and D9 did not belong to the prior art under Art. 54(2) EPC and could not be considered for assessing inventive step of the claimed subject-matter of auxiliary request 1.

Résumé

In T 439/22 the interpretation of the term "gathered sheet" in claim 1 was decisive to assess novelty. In particular, the prior-art document D1 disclosed – in addition to all other features of the claim – a tobacco sheet spirally wound. The board stated that a skilled person in the current technical field would understand the term "gathered sheet", when read in isolation, as defining a sheet folded along lines to occupy a tridimensional space. Accordingly, when assigning this usual meaning to the term, the subject-matter of claim 1 would have to be regarded as novel. However, if the same term was read in a broader but still technically meaningful manner in view of the definition in paragraph [0035] of the description, the subject-matter of claim 1 would lack novelty. Said paragraph [0035] establishes that "the term "gathered" denotes that the sheet of tobacco material is convoluted, folded, or otherwise compressed or constricted substantially transversely to the cylindrical axis of the rod."

The board examined the case law of the boards and concluded that it was divergent on the following questions, which were all decisive for the case in hand:

- legal basis for construing patent claims

- whether it is a prerequisite for taking the figures and description into account when construing a patent claim, that the claim wording, when read in isolation, be found to be unclear or ambiguous

- extent to which a patent can serve as its own dictionary

According to the board, a decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal was also required because a point of law of fundamental importance had arisen, since claim construction by the EPO had to be seen within the greater context of the patent protection system as a whole. To provide an overview on claim interpretation in validity and enforcement proceedings, the board took into account decisions of national courts in France, Germany and United Kingdom as well as two recent decisions of the Court of Appeal of the Unified Patent Court (Nanostring v 10x Genomics, UPC CoA 335/2023, App 576355/2023 of 26 February 2024; VusionGroup v Hanshow (APL 8/2024, ORD 17447/2024) of 13 May 2024).

The board concluded that, in order to come to a decision in the case at hand, three questions first had to be answered, both to ensure the uniform application of the law and because a point of law of fundamental importance had arisen. The board thus referred the following questions to the Enlarged Board (referral pending under G 1/24 – Heated aerosol):

1. Is Art. 69(1), second sentence EPC and Art. 1 of the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 EPC to be applied to the interpretation of patent claims when assessing the patentability of an invention under Art. 52 to 57 EPC? [see points 3.2, 4.2 and 6.1 of the Reasons]

2. May the description and figures be consulted when interpreting the claims to assess patentability and, if so, may this be done generally or only if the person skilled in the art finds a claim to be unclear or ambiguous when read in isolation? [see points 3.3, 4.3 and 6.2 of the Reasons]

3. May a definition or similar information on a term used in the claims which is explicitly given in the description be disregarded when interpreting the claims to assess patentability and, if so, under what conditions? [see points 3.4, 4.4 and 6.3 of the Reasons]

Résumé

In T 2030/20 befasste sich die Kammer mit der Auslegung der Begriffe "Tauchrohr" und "eines Durchmessers" in Anspruch 1 im Rahmen der Neuheitsprüfung.

Die Patentinhaberin wollte den Begriff "Tauchrohr" in Anspruch 1 des erteilten Patents im Sinne des unmittelbaren Wortsinns verstanden wissen, wonach das Rohr dazu geeignet sein solle, in ein Kulturmedium einzutauchen. Ein Tauchrohr müsse demnach insbesondere lang genug ausgebildet sein, um das Kulturmedium, beispielsweise eine Flüssigkeit wie die Kulturbrühe oder ein Gel, eines angeschlossenen Einweg-Bioreaktors erreichen zu können.

Die Kammer merkte an, dass nach ständiger Rechtsprechung den in einem Patent verwendeten Begriffen die im einschlägigen Stand der Technik übliche Bedeutung zu geben sei, sofern ihnen nicht in der Beschreibung des Patents ein besonderer Sinn zugewiesen wurde (siehe Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern, 10. Auflage 2022, Kapitel II.A.6.3.3; vgl. auch T 1473/19). Sei Letzteres der Fall, könne dies auch dazu führen, dass einem Anspruchsmerkmal gegenüber der im einschlägigen Stand der Technik üblichen Bedeutung im Lichte der Beschreibung eine breitere Bedeutung zukomme. Dies sei im vorliegenden Fall so.

Zwar sei es gemäß den in den Figuren dargestellten Ausführungsformen des Patents, wie von der Patentinhaberin dargelegt, bevorzugt, dass ein Tauchrohr des Patents dazu vorgesehen sei, in eine im Bioreaktor bestimmungsgemäß vorhandene Kulturbrühe einzutauchen. Allerdings weise das Patent dem Begriff "Tauchrohr" in der Beschreibung eine über den eigentlichen Wortsinn hinausgehende, breitere Bedeutung zu, wonach ein Tauchrohr lediglich in den Reaktionsraum ragen könne, also irgendwo innerhalb des Reaktionsraums oberhalb des Flüssigkeitsspiegels enden könne.

Die vorgenommenen Änderungen im Hilfsantrag 1 betrafen die Beschreibung der Tauchrohre in Absätze 46 und 60. Die Kammer war jedoch der Ansicht, dass die unverändert belassenen Absätze der Patentschrift weiterhin definierten, dass die Tauchrohre im Sinne des Patents lediglich lang genug ausgebildet sein müssten, um in den Reaktionsraum zu ragen.

Im Hilfsantrag 4 wurde folgendes Merkmal ergänzt: "und wobei die Tauchrohre eine Länge von über 50 Prozent eines Durchmessers der Kopfplatte aufweisen". Von den Beteiligten wurde diskutiert, was unter "eines Durchmessers" zu verstehen sei.

Nach Ansicht der Kammer müsse die Wortfolge "eines Durchmessers" im Gesamtzusammenhang des Anspruchs und der Patentschrift (T 367/20) als Maß für die Ausdehnung der Kopfplatte, also als Maß für ihren Gesamtdurchmesser, verstanden werden. Bei nur isolierter Betrachtung des Wortlautes von Anspruch 1 bestehe eine technisch sinnvolle Auslegung der Wortfolge "eines Durchmessers" darin, dass der Fachmann sich bei der Definition der Länge der Tauchrohre im Bezug auf die Kopfplatte an der für die Kopfplatte charakterisierenden Größe des Gesamtdurchmessers orientiere – und nicht an dem Durchmesser lediglich eines Teiles der Kopfplatte, welcher für die Größe der gesamten Kopfplatte nicht repräsentativ sei. Sollte ein Fachmann nichtsdestotrotz Zweifel daran haben, welche Bedeutung dem Begriff "eines Durchmessers" in Anspruch 1 zukomme, würde er die Beschreibung des Patents konsultieren. Die Patentschrift stütze das o.g. Verständnis der Wortfolge "eines Durchmessers".

Résumé

In T 566/20 the parties disagreed on the interpretation of the feature "the position information in association with the serial number information output from the position control device".

The appellant (opponent) submitted that the position control device could output the serial number information, possibly with the position information. In their opinion, this interpretation was grammatically correct, made technical sense and was not disclosed in the application as originally filed.

In the respondent's view, it was apparent from the claim that the output from the position control device concerned the position information in association with the serial number information. The respondent also noted that this interpretation was in accordance with the disclosure of the application as filed.

The board concurred with the appellant that outputting both the position information and the associated serial number information from the position control device was technically sensible. It further agreed with the appellant that the fact that the claim did not include a step of receiving serial number information did not necessarily mean that the position control device did not receive this information. Outputting both the position information and the serial number information allowed the vision measuring system to match position information with image information by unambiguously correlating serial number information associated with, or included in, each of them. This interpretation did not appear to give rise to incompatibilities with the remaining features of the claim.

Moreover, the board endorsed the view that a patent proprietor would be awarded an unwarranted advantage if it were allowed to restrict the claimed subject-matter by discarding at will technically reasonable interpretations in view of the description (see T 1127/16 and T 169/20). Therefore, the fact that the description and drawings support one interpretation of an ambiguous feature was not sufficient for other interpretations of the ambiguous feature that are technically reasonable in the context of the claim to be discarded.

Résumé

In T 1726/22 the claimed subject-matter was defined by parameters; however, even though the claims related to an acetylated wood as such, the parameters, i.e. the shrinkage ratios, were defined in relation to the wood before acetylation. The application did not mention anything regarding how the shrinkage ratios, relative to the shrinkage before acetylation, could be determined on the basis of the acetylated wood.

According to the appellant, the shrinkage ratios could be easily determined during the manufacture of the acetylated wood, during which the wood before acetylation was necessarily available and its shrinkage could thus be measured easily. The board found that this argument was not convincing. It noted that it was not enough for the requirement of clarity to be fulfilled that the parameter could be measured when manufacturing the wood, as the manufacturing method was not specified in the claim. The skilled person needs to be able to determine whether a given acetylated wood falls within the scope of the claim, the claim being directed to an acetylated wood as such. As outlined in T 849/11, an applicant who chooses to define the scope of the claim by parameters should ensure, inter alia, that a skilled person can easily and unambiguously verify whether they are working inside or outside the scope of the claim; however, in the present case, it was impossible for the skilled person faced with the acetylated wood to revert to the manufacturing process during which the shrinkage before acetylation could have been measured, or to the unacetylated wood.

The appellant also argued that the skilled person could alternatively measure the shrinkage ratio by using "a reference non-acetylated wood sample of the same wood species having similar properties". In the appellant's view this meant the same wood species of the same geographic origin, and the same part of the tree, i.e. heartwood or sapwood. The appellant submitted that the skilled person could identify the wood species by isotope analysis.

The board pointed out that using a reference wood was not suggested anywhere, let alone specified in the claim. Even if it was nevertheless assumed that the skilled person had the idea to turn to using a reference wood, they would not find any instructions on how to select a suitable reference wood. It thus could not be concluded that the skilled person would necessarily select a wood using the same criteria as identified by the appellant. Considering that the choice of the reference wood, and indeed the choice of the measuring method in general, was in no way limited, it could not be concluded that repeatable and reliable results for the shrinkage ratios would be obtained on this basis, irrespective of the question of whether such a reference wood could be reliably identified, and whether such a reference wood was at all representative of the (acetylated) wood under consideration.

The board recalled that there are cases in which it is not necessary to specify the measuring method for a parameter in the claim, namely when it is ("convincingly") shown that the method to be employed belongs to the skilled person's common general knowledge, or all the methodologies known in the relevant technical field for determining this parameter yield the same result within the appropriate limit of measurement accuracy (T 849/11); however, it was a mere assertion by the appellant that the skilled person could and would use a reference wood, and that this would lead to reliable results. This assertion was not even supported by the application, nor was any other supporting information available. By contrast with the appellant's view, it thus could not be concluded that the present case would be such an exceptional case in which it would be unnecessary to specify the measuring method. The requirements of Art. 84 EPC were therefore not met.

Résumé

In T 419/16 of 24 June 2024 the application on which the European patent was granted (the "application") was filed as a PCT application on 15 February 2005 (the "PCT application"). It named (i) parties A1, A2 and A3 as inventors and applicants for the United States of America (US) and (ii) corporation B1 as applicant for all other designated States. Party A4 was added under R. 92bis.1 PCT as applicant and inventor for the US. The PCT application claimed priority from a US provisional patent application filed on 17 February 2004 in the name of A1, A2 and A3, the inventors (the "priority application").

The board summarised the matters decided by it in its interlocutory decision T 419/16 of 3 February 2022. On novelty, it had noted that the disclosure in document D1, published after the priority date but before the filing date of the patent, would, in the absence of a valid priority, anticipate the subject-matter of claim 1 of auxiliary request 1. The board had decided that the subject-matter of claims 1 and 2 of auxiliary request 1 related to the same invention as disclosed in the previous application in the sense of Art. 87(1) EPC. The appellants had objected to the validity of the claimed priority querying whether a valid transfer of the right to claim priority from the priority application had taken place prior to the filing of the PCT application. Because the board's decision on this issue hinged on an answer to questions referred to the Enlarged Board of Appeal (the Enlarged Board) in consolidated cases G 1/22 and G 2/22, the board had decided to stay the proceedings until a decision was issued by the Enlarged Board.

The board recalled that in G 1/22 and G 2/22 the Enlarged Board had decided that entitlement to claim priority (and any related assignments of priority rights) should be assessed under the autonomous law of the EPC. Furthermore, the Enlarged Board had decided that there was a rebuttable presumption under the autonomous law of the EPC that the applicant claiming priority in accordance with Art. 88(1) EPC and the corresponding Implementing Regulations was entitled to claim priority.

According to the board, this presumption applied in the factual situation of the case at hand. Moreover, in the situation where the PCT application was jointly filed by parties A and B, (i) designating party A (here A1, A2 and A3) as inventors and applicants for the US only and party B (here B1) for all designated States except the US, and (ii) claiming priority from an earlier patent application (here the priority application) designating party A as the applicant, the joint filing implied an agreement between parties A and B, allowing party B to rely on the priority, unless there were substantial factual indications to the contrary.

Appellant-opponent 5 argued that contrary to the opposition division's finding in the decision under appeal, there had been no valid transfer of the priority right prior to the filing of the PCT application. Appellant-opponent 5 based this objection on the reason that the transfer had not been proven by the respondent in a formal way.

In the board's opinion, in view of the Enlarged Board's decision that the joint filing of the PCT application implies an agreement between parties A and B, allowing party B to rely on the priority, the aforementioned objection could not succeed because there was no requirement under the EPC that a transfer of the priority right be proven in a formal way. Furthermore, there were no substantial factual indications brought forward by the appellants that could lead to the conclusion that the joint filing of the PCT application did not imply an agreement between the applicants of the priority application and corporation B1 as the co-applicant of the subsequent PCT application (for all States other than the US). Thus, the presumption of entitlement to priority was not rebutted, and the priority claimed from the priority application as regards the subject-matter of claims 1 and 2 was valid.

Résumé

In T 2360/19 the patent was based on a European patent application which was a divisional application of an earlier European patent resulting from an international PCT application. This PCT application claimed priority from 12 US provisional applications (P1 to P12). The opposition division, applying the so-called "all applicants approach", had found that priority was not validly claimed from P1, P2, P5 and P11 because these had been filed by joint applicants (Party A1 or Party A2 being among them) and neither Party A1 nor Party A2 were named as applicants in the PCT application (and consequently in the patent in suit). This had led to a finding that the patent was not novel and to the revocation of the patent. The patent proprietors (appellants) had appealed the decision of the opposition division.

The board pointed out that there had been a dispute in the US (the inventorship dispute) regarding whether Party A1, an employee of Party A2, should also be named as one of the inventors in the PCT application (PCT/US2013/074819), and about the ownership of the patent. The inventorship dispute had been resolved in January 2018: an independent arbitrator had decided, inter alia, that neither Party A1 should be named as an inventor, nor Party A2 as a proprietor in the PCT application.

The board recalled that in G 1/22 and G 2/22 the Enlarged Board had found that "entitlement to priority should in principle be presumed to exist to the benefit of the subsequent applicant of the European patent application if the applicant claims priority in accordance with Art. 88(1) EPC and the corresponding Implementing Regulations…". This presumption was based on the concept of an implicit (implied, tacit or informal) agreement on the transfer of the priority right from the priority applicant to the subsequent applicant "under almost any circumstances". It, notably, allowed ex-post (retroactive, nunc pro tunc, ex tunc) transfers concluded after the filing of the subsequent application. The Enlarged Board had noted, however, that "the allowability of a retroactive transfer of priority rights may have limited practical relevance if priority entitlement is presumed to exist on the date on which the priority is claimed for the subsequent European application." Moreover, the Enlarged Board had found that a priority right and its transfer was a matter exclusively governed by the autonomous law of the EPC. Consequently, there was no room for the application of national laws on legal presumptions and their rebuttal.

The board further recalled that the presumption that the subsequent applicant was entitled to the priority right was a strong presumption, under "normal circumstances". It applied to any case in which the subsequent applicant was not identical with the priority applicant, and thus also to a plurality of co-applicants for the priority application regardless of the extent to which that group overlaps with the co-applicants for the subsequent application. This was the situation in the present case. Thus, the presumption of a validly claimed priority applied.

G 1/22 and G 2/22 further provided that the presumption can be rebutted to take into account "rare exceptional circumstances" where the subsequent applicant cannot justifiably rely on the priority. The rebuttable presumption thus involved the reversal of the burden of proof, i.e. the party challenging the subsequent applicant's entitlement to priority had to prove that this entitlement was missing. Just raising speculative doubts – even if these were "serious" – was not sufficient.

The board noted that the opponent's arguments were mainly based on documents concerning the resolution of the inventorship dispute, which said nothing about priority entitlement. From this, the opponents argued that these documents did not provide any basis for inferring the existence of an implicit transfer of the priority rights from Party A1/A2 to the appellants and, therefore, that the appellants had not provided evidence that they were entitled to the priority rights they claimed. According to the board, however, the presumption in G 1/22 and G 2/22 stated that the appellants do not have to provide such evidence, but the opponents have to rebut the presumption. There was no evidence that rebutted the presumption in the present case. If at all, there was evidence supporting the presumption of an implied transfer agreement. The entire purpose of the inventorship dispute was to have Party A1 named as inventor, and Party A2 as proprietor, in the PCT application. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it was not credible that Party A1 or Party A2 would have acted in any way to invalidate the priority claim of the patent.

The board found the priority claims to be valid and remitted the case to the opposition division for further prosecution.

Résumé

In T 1054/22 the examining division had concluded that claim 1 of the main request did not fulfil requirements of Art. 123(2) or 76(1) EPC, among other things, and it refused the patent application.

In its submissions on appeal, the applicant had argued that applying the criteria of G 1/93 (point 16 of the Reasons), the amendments did not result in an unwarranted advantage. Amended claim 1 of the main request was based on the earlier application as filed. This applied in particular to the amendments concerning the omega-6 to omega-3 ratio of 4:1 or greater and the concentration of omega-6 fatty acids (4-75% by weight of total lipids) and omega-3 fatty acids (0.1-30% by weight of total lipids).

The board dismissed the appeal. It explained that determining whether an amendment complied with the requirements of Art. 123(2) and 76(1) EPC was assessed using the "gold standard". This term was coined in G 2/10, in which the jurisprudence developed by the Enlarged Board in opinion G 3/89 and decision G 11/91 was confirmed.

The board explained that G 1/93 primarily concerned a case in which a granted claim could not be maintained unamended in opposition proceedings because the claim was found to contravene Art. 123(2) EPC. The examining division had allowed an amendment that should not have been allowed. As explained in G 2/10 (point 4.3 of the Reasons, last paragraph), G 1/93 was not intended to modify the "gold standard".

According to G 1/93, the purpose of Art. 123(2) EPC (and Art. 76(1) EPC) was to prevent an applicant from gaining an unwarranted advantage by obtaining patent protection for something it had not properly disclosed on the date of filing of the application. An added feature limiting the scope of the claim may still contravene Art. 123(2) EPC. An example of this, explicitly mentioned in G 1/93, is a limiting feature that creates an inventive selection not disclosed in the application as filed or otherwise derivable therefrom.

In the case in hand, value ranges had been added to claim 1 of the main request, in features a), (i) and (ii). The question was whether the skilled person would have derived these amendments directly and unambiguously, using common general knowledge, from the entirety of the earlier application as filed. What had to be examined was not only whether there was a basis for each of the features added by the amendments but also whether the skilled person would have derived the combination of features a), (i) and (ii), and that combination of features alone, from the earlier application as filed.

The board concluded that no basis could be found in the earlier application as filed for the combination of the concentration of omega-6 fatty acids of 4-75% by weight of total lipids and omega-3 fatty acids of 0.1-30% by weight of total lipids (feature (i) of claim 1 of the main request). As to the ratio (feature a) of claim 1 of the main request), there was no basis in the earlier application as filed for an open-ended ratio of omega-6 to omega-3 fatty acids of 4:1 or greater. Thus, claim 1 of the main request contravened Art. 76(1) EPC.

Résumé

Ex parte Fall T 553/23 betraf die Lokalisierung von Objekten in einem Laderaum eines Transportfahrzeugs mittels einer optischen Positionserkennung. Die Anmeldung wurde von der Prüfungsabteilung im Wesentlichen zurückgewiesen, weil keiner der Anträge die Erfordernisse der Ausführbarkeit erfüllte.

Bezüglich der Prüfung des Hauptantrags (nicht gewährbar), erinnerte die Kammer zunächst daran, dass Art. 83 EPÜ nicht erfüllt sei, wenn eine im Anspruch ausgedrückte Wirkung nicht reproduziert werden könne. Die Prüfungsabteilung habe die Ausführbarkeit der beanspruchten Lehre auf Grund der Problematik eines verdeckten Sichtfelds für die optische Positionsbestimmung zurecht in Frage gestellt. Denn um ein stetes Nachverfolgen der Position eines Objekts im Laderaum zu gewährleisten, musste dieses jederzeit optisch erkennbar sein. Dies trifft vor allem dann bei einer mehrlagigen Beladung nicht zu. Die Beschwerdeführerin argumentierte, dass Anspruch 1 auch den speziellen Fall umfasse, dass genau ein Objekt transportiert wird. Dabei könne die Problematik eines verdeckten Sichtfelds gar nicht auftreten und damit sei die Lehre auf jeden Fall ausführbar. Die Kammer stimmte dem zwar zu, jedoch muss die beanspruchte Lehre in ihrer ganzen Breite ausführbar sein, also auch für den eigentlichen Anwendungsfall der Erfindung, bei dem eine Mehrzahl von Objekten nebeneinander und in mehreren Lagen transportiert werden.

Was den Fall einer mehrlagigen Anordnung von Objekten betrifft, stimmte die Kammer der angefochtenen Entscheidung zu, dass nicht alle Objekte sicher optisch lokalisiert werden können. Dies gilt unabhängig von der räumlichen Anordnung einer Kamera (oder eines Laserscanners) im Laderaum. Damit wird der angestrebte Zweck mit den beanspruchten Mitteln nicht sicher erreicht. Daran können auch Versuche des Fachmanns nichts ändern. Das Argument der angeblich üblichen Messunsicherheit wurde zurückgewiesen. Auch eine Zeugeneinvernahme des Erfinders könne daran nichts ändern, da diese die Offenbarung nicht ersetze.

Im Hilfsantrag (gewährbar) ging es um nebeneinander angeordnete Objekte, nicht mehr um nur ein transportiertes Objekt oder um den problematischen mehrlagigen Fall. Es wurde spezifiziert, dass die Positionsbestimmungsvorrichtung an der Decke des Laderaums angebracht war. Keine eindeutige Aussage konnte darüber getroffen werden, ob ein großes Objekt das Sichtfeld auf ein kleines Objekt verdeckt. In Anspruch 1 fehlten nähere Informationen zur räumlichen Anordnung der Kamera, die eine Ausführbarkeit der Erfindung für alle möglichen unterschiedliche Größen von Objekten gewährleistete. Es könne (anders als beim mehrlagigen Fall mit übereinandergestapelten Objekten) nicht pauschal angenommen werden, dass die beanspruchte Lehre nicht ausführbar sei. Jedoch muss der Fachmann zumindest Versuche durchführen, wozu ihm die Anmeldungsunterlagen abgesehen von dem Ausführungsbeispiel nach Figur 1 keine Hilfestellung boten.

Nach der Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern ist nicht erforderlich, dass eine Reproduktion in jeder denkbaren theoretischen Konstellation gelingt. "In einem Anspruch wird allgemein versucht, eine Vorrichtung unter Idealbedingungen zu definieren. Kann sich der Fachmann unter Berücksichtigung der Offenbarung und des allgemeinen Fachwissens erschließen, was funktioniert und was nicht, ist eine beanspruchte Erfindung hinreichend offenbart, auch wenn eine breite Auslegung einen Gegenstand einschließen könnte, der nicht funktioniert. Im vorliegenden Fall ist der Fachmann in der Lage, Situationen direkt zu erkennen und auszuschließen, die offenkundig die angestrebte Wirkung nicht erzielen (etwa aufgrund einer verdeckten Sicht) und darauf durch eine angepasste Positionsbestimmungsvorrichtung zu reagieren. Die Kammer hat keine Zweifel daran, dass der Fachmann im Rahmen seines allgemeinen Fachwissens das funktionale Merkmal einer optischen Positionsbestimmungsvorrichtung den Größenverhältnissen der zu transportierenden Objekte anpassen würde", so die Kammer in ihrem Orientierungssatz (s. auch Punkt 3.5 der Gründe). Der zweite Absatz des Orientierungssatzes betrifft die Ermittlung des nächstliegenden Stands der Technik für die Bewertung der erfinderischen Tätigkeit.

Résumé

In T 1809/20 appellants 1 and 2 (opponents) objected that claim 1 of the main request contained subject-matter extending beyond the content of the application as filed.

Claim 1 of the main request related to a method for producing a certain purified protein. The board agreed that, as submitted by the appellants, claim 1 of the main request comprised multiple selections regarding the type of protein to be purified (antibody, antibody fragment, or Fc fusion protein), the concentration of arginine or arginine derivative in the wash solution (in a range of 0.05-0.85 M), the concentration of the non-buffering salt in the wash solution (in a range of 0.1-2.0 M), and the pH of the wash solution (being greater than 8.0).

The board explained that it is established case law that the content of the application as filed must not be considered a reservoir from which features pertaining to separate embodiments are taken and combined to artificially create a particular embodiment without the presence of a pointer to combine the features of the separate embodiments.

In the case in hand, nothing in the application as filed pointed to the specific combination of selections made in claim 1 of the main request. Firstly, two selections were needed to arrive at the protein to be purified and nothing in the application as filed pointed to any preference for combining these selections. Secondly, the chosen range of the concentration of arginine or arginine derivative in the wash solution was only at an intermediate level of preference in the application as filed, while the most preferred range was narrower. Thirdly, the selected range of the concentration of the non-buffering salt in the wash solution represented the selection of the broadest range out of the list of ranges in the application as filed. Finally, the chosen pH of the wash solution was the broadest range of the pH disclosed in a passage of the description and it did not constitute a preferred embodiment.

Regarding the examples, the board explained that each of the concentration values of arginine and arginine-HCl in the wash solution in the examples of the application as filed fell within the range selected in claim 1 of the main request. However, the board observed that each of these concentration values also fell within the most preferred range disclosed in the application as filed. Moreover, each of the concentration values of the non-buffering salt (sodium chloride) in the wash solution of the examples in the application as filed fell within the range selected in claim 1 of the main request. However, each of these concentration values also fell within one of the other two ranges disclosed in the description of the application as filed. Therefore, the examples in the application as filed did not point to the combination of features resulting from the selections of at least the concentration of arginine or arginine derivative and the concentration of the non-buffering salt in the wash solution.

In view of the above, the board concluded that the combination of the features relating to the specification of the protein to be purified, the concentration of arginine or arginine derivative in the wash solution, the concentration of the non-buffering salt in the wash solution and the pH of the wash solution was based on multiple selections at different levels of preference without any pointer being present in the application as filed for these selections. The skilled person reading the application as filed would thus find no guidance as to which of the preferred features they had to start with and which of the other features were then to be combined.

It followed that claim 1 of the main request did not meet the requirements of Art. 123(2) EPC.

Résumé

In J 1/24 the Legal Board examined an appeal against the decision of the Receiving Section dated 14 September 2023 that the appellant's European patent application, filed on 24 May 2021, would not be treated as a divisional application. A decision to grant had been issued for the earlier application (hereinafter parent application) on 18 February 2021, setting an original date of publication of the mention of grant as 17 March 2021. On 16 April 2021, the applicant had filed an appeal against this decision to grant. As a consequence, the date of publication of the mention of grant had been deleted. After filing its grounds of appeal, the appellant had withdrawn its appeal in April 2022.

The Legal Board observed that the question to be decided in the present case was whether the parent application was still pending according to R. 36 EPC when the divisional application was filed. It recalled that in G 1/09 (point 3.2.4 of the Reasons), the Enlarged Board had concluded that a "pending application" was a patent application in a status in which substantive rights deriving therefrom under the EPC were (still) in existence. Substantive rights, which included provisional protection under Art. 67 EPC, might continue to exist after the refusal of the application until the decision to refuse becomes final (G 1/09, point 4.2.1. of the Reasons). The retroactive effect of a final decision refusing the rights conferred did not influence the pending status of the application before such decision was final. The Legal Board also recalled that, according to an obiter dictum in G 1/09, in the case of grant the pending status of a European patent application normally ceases on the day before the mention of its grant is published.

The Legal Board referred to J 28/03, which differentiated between the decision to refuse the parent application and the decision to grant the parent application, wherein an appeal against the decision to grant the patent as requested could not benefit from the suspensive effect of an appeal against the refusal of a patent application. It noted that in J 28/03, the date of publication of the mention of grant was not deleted, so that the grant of the patent became effective. The earlier application was therefore no longer "pending". On the contrary in the present case, the date of publication of the mention of the grant had been deleted as a result of the appeal filed and therefore the parent application was still pending.

The Legal Board was not convinced by the principle stated in J 28/03 that the answer to the question, whether the parent application was still "pending", depended on the outcome of the appeal against its grant. It referred to Art. 106(1), second sentence, EPC, according to which an appeal has suspensive effect, and observed that the provision did not distinguish between an appeal against the refusal or against the grant of a patent. The later decision G 1/09 stated that a patent application refused by the examining division was still pending within the meaning of R. 25 EPC 1973 until the expiry of the period for filing an appeal. The Legal Board found that the same conclusion had to apply to R. 36(1) EPC in its former and its current version. It further concluded that "pending grant proceedings" were not required, as pending proceedings could not be equated with a pending application (G 1/09). The issue was whether substantive rights still derived from the application. In the present case, the deletion of the date of the mention of grant prevented the grant of the patent becoming effective. Thus, substantive rights still derived from the application which was therefore still pending.

The Legal Board disagreed with the position in J 28/03 that "an appeal against a decision granting a patent and resulting in the publication of the grant of the patent would be expected to be inadmissible with respect to Art. 107(1) EPC and should therefore not benefit of the possibility to file a divisional application even during the appeal procedure". The current practice of the EPO treats appeals against the grant of a patent as appeals validly filed, with the consequence that the date of the mention of the grant is deleted in such a case. The board considered it inconsistent to view an appeal in two different ways: on the one hand, for the mention of the grant to be deleted, the appeal would only need to be admissible; on the other hand, the application of the suspensive effect would depend on the outcome of the appeal proceedings. There was no basis in Art. 106(1) EPC for this approach. In the established case law of the Boards of Appeal, an example of a clearly inadmissible appeal that should have no suspensive effect was an appeal without basis in the EPC, e.g. filed by a third party. The EPC however had no provision restricting appeals of the applicant against the grant of a patent. Such an appeal could not therefore be seen as clearly inadmissible. Thus, the parent patent application at hand was still pending when the divisional application was filed.

Résumé

In T 2689/19 the European patent application on which the patent was based was a divisional application of an earlier European patent resulting from an international PCT application. This PCT application claimed priority from six US provisional applications (P1, P2, P5, P11, P13 and P14). The opposition division, applying the so-called "all applicants approach", had found that priority was not validly claimed from P1, P2, P5 and P11 because these had been filed by joint applicants (Party A1 or Party A2 being among them) and neither Party A1 nor Party A2 were named as applicants in the PCT application (and consequently in the patent in suit). This had led to a finding that the patent as granted lacked novelty and to its revocation. The patent proprietors appealed the opposition division's decision.

The board pointed out that there had been a dispute in the US (the inventorship dispute) regarding whether Party A1, an employee of Party A2, should also be named as one of the inventors in the PCT application (PCT/US2013/074743), and about the ownership of the patent. The inventorship dispute had been resolved in January 2018: an independent arbitrator had decided, inter alia, that neither Party A1 should be named as an inventor, nor Party A2 as a proprietor in the PCT application.

The board recalled that in G 1/22 and G 2/22 the Enlarged Board had found that "entitlement to priority should in principle be presumed to exist to the benefit of the subsequent applicant of the European patent application if the applicant claims priority in accordance with Art. 88(1) EPC and the corresponding Implementing Regulations…". This presumption was based on the concept of an implicit (implied, tacit or informal) agreement on the transfer of the priority right from the priority applicant to the subsequent applicant "under almost any circumstances". It, notably, allowed ex-post (retroactive, nunc pro tunc, ex tunc) transfers concluded after the filing of the subsequent application. The Enlarged Board had noted, however, that "the allowability of a retroactive transfer of priority rights may have limited practical relevance if priority entitlement is presumed to exist on the date on which the priority is claimed for the subsequent European application." Moreover, the Enlarged Board had found that a priority right and its transfer was a matter exclusively governed by the autonomous law of the EPC. Consequently, there was no room for the application of national laws on legal presumptions and their rebuttal.

The board further recalled that the presumption that the subsequent applicant was entitled to the priority right was a strong presumption, under "normal circumstances". It applied to any case in which the subsequent applicant was not identical with the priority applicant, and thus also to a plurality of co-applicants for the priority application regardless of the extent to which that group overlaps with the co-applicants for the subsequent application. This was the situation in the present case. Thus, the presumption of a validly claimed priority applied.

G 1/22 and G 2/22 further provided that the presumption can be rebutted to take into account "rare exceptional circumstances" where the subsequent applicant cannot justifiably rely on the priority. The rebuttable presumption thus involved the reversal of the burden of proof, i.e. the party challenging the subsequent applicant's entitlement to priority had to prove that this entitlement was missing. Just raising speculative doubts – even if these were "serious" – was not sufficient.

The board noted that the opponent's arguments were mainly based on documents concerning the resolution of the inventorship dispute, which said nothing about priority entitlement. From this, the opponents argued that these documents did not provide any basis for inferring the existence of an implicit transfer of the priority rights from Party A1/A2 to the appellants and, therefore, that the appellants had not provided evidence that they were entitled to the priority rights they claimed. According to the board, however, the presumption in G 1/22 and G 2/22 stated that the appellants do not have to provide such evidence, but the opponents have to rebut the presumption. There was no evidence that rebutted the presumption in the present case. If at all, there was evidence supporting the presumption of an implied transfer agreement. The entire purpose of the inventorship dispute was to have Party A1 named as inventor, and Party A2 as proprietor, in the PCT application. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it was not credible that Party A1 or Party A2 would have acted in any way to invalidate the priority claim of the patent.

The board found the priority claims to be valid and remitted the case to the opposition division for further prosecution.

Résumé

In T 2132/21 the patent claimed priority from a US application filed in the name of four inventors. In the filing of the PCT application leading to the patent, the four inventors were named as applicants for the US only and a corporation was named as applicant for all other states. The appellant (opponent) argued that the priority was not valid because there was no evidence that the priority rights had been transferred to the respondent (patent proprietor) before the PCT application was filed.

The board recalled that in G 1/22 and G 2/22 the Enlarged Board had stated that in a situation where a PCT application is jointly filed by parties A and B, (i) designating party A for one or more designated States and party B for one or more other designated States, and (ii) claiming priority from an earlier patent application designating party A as the applicant, the joint filing implies an agreement between parties A and B allowing party B to rely on the priority, unless there are substantial factual indications to the contrary. This was the situation in the case in hand. Thus, the joint filing of the PCT application, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, was sufficient proof of an implied agreement on the joint use of the priority right.

The board concluded that, on formal grounds, the priority claim was valid.

Résumé

In T 56/21 the board addressed the question whether Art. 84 EPC provides a legal basis for (i) objecting to an inconsistency between what is disclosed as the invention in the description (and/or drawings, if any) and the subject-matter of the claims, the inconsistency being that the description (or any drawing) contains subject-matter which is not claimed, and (ii) requiring removal of this inconsistency by way of amendment of the description (hereinafter: "adaptation of the description").

As the appeal concerned ex parte proceedings, the board dealt with the interpretation of Art. 84 EPC for the purpose of its application in examination proceedings. The board analysed the function and relationship of the claims and the description, the relationship between the assessment of patentability and the determination of the extent of protection as well as the requirements of support by the description and clarity in Art. 84 EPC.

On adaptation of the description, the board came to the following conclusions:

(a) Art. 84 and R. 43 EPC set forth requirements for the claims, not for the description.

(b) It is the purpose of the assessment of Art. 84 EPC as part of the examination of patentability to arrive at a definition of the patentable subject-matter in terms of distinctive technical features distinguishing it from the prior art.

(c) Art. 69(1) EPC and the Protocol on the Interpretation of Art. 69 EPC are not concerned with the definition of the subject-matter according to Art. 84, first sentence, EPC, or the assessment of patentability in examination before the EPO but with the extent of protection in the context of infringement proceedings in the contracting states. Art. 69 EPC and its Protocol are hence not applicable in grant proceedings before the EPO.

(d) The requirements of Art. 84 EPC and R. 43 EPC are to be assessed separately and independently of considerations of extent of protection when examining a patent application.

(e) In examination, future legal certainty is best served by a strict definitional approach which ensures that allowable claims per se provide an unambiguous definition of the subject-matter meeting the requirements for patentability.

(f) Adapting the description to match the more limited subject-matter claimed does not improve legal certainty but reduces the reservoir of technical information in the granted patent. This may have unwarranted consequences in post-grant proceedings and may encroach on the competence of national courts and legislators.

(g) R. 48 EPC is not concerned with the adaptation of the description, but with the avoidance of expressions which are contrary to public morality or public order, or certain disparaging or irrelevant statements in the publication of an application.

The board held that in examination of a patent application, neither Art. 84 nor R. 42, 43 and 48 EPC provide a legal basis for requiring that the description be adapted to match allowable claims of more limited subject-matter. Within the limits of Art. 123 EPC, an applicant may, however, amend the description of its own volition.

In the case at hand the description included a passage entitled "SPECIFIC EMBODIMENTS", which contained claim-like clauses. Those clauses included subject-matter which was not claimed. The board set aside the (refusal) decision under appeal and the case was remitted to the examining division with the order to grant a patent based on the main request on file.

Résumé

In T 1152/21 the board concluded that claim 1 of auxiliary requests 9b and 10a did not meet the requirements of Art. 84 EPC.

Claim 1 of auxiliary request 9b included the term "cooling to an appropriate temperature". The board found that the skilled person could not assess whether a particular temperature was an "appropriate temperature", since the wording of the claim did not allow them to determine the conditions under which a temperature was an "appropriate temperature". Therefore, the claim was not clear.

The patent proprietor (appellant) had submitted that the skilled person was very familiar with heating and cooling steps, which were inherent to any (re)crystallisation process. It was a routine task for the skilled person to determine said appropriate temperature by reasonable trial-and-error experiments. Hence, the feature "appropriate temperature" was a functional feature related to a process step which could easily be performed in order to obtain the desired result. The board did not agree. It held that the patent proprietor's submission was relevant for sufficiency of disclosure rather than for the clarity of the claim. The relevant issue was what was covered by claim 1 of auxiliary request 9b, not whether the skilled person could reproduce the claimed method.

Auxiliary request 10a included in claim 1 the following terms: "heating to about 70°C", "heating at about 70°C", "heating the organic layer to about 120°C", "cooling to about 80°C", "maintaining the mixture at about 80°C for about 3 hours" and "gradually cooling to about 10°C".

The board noted that the term "about" in the context of said claim was associated with a specific temperature or a specific time. It could be that the term "about" was intended to cover measurement errors. However, measurement errors were covered for any value of any technical parameter to be measured and given in any claim (without the need for the term "about") since patents were in the field of technology, not mathematics, and a value could only be as precise as it could be measured according to the general technological convention. Thus, following this interpretation, the term "about" was superfluous and claim 1 was not concise, contrary to what was required by Art. 84 EPC. Alternatively, the term "about" could be intended to denote a range broader than the measurement error range. Following this second interpretation, it could not be determined how broad the range could be in claim 1 and what the exact limits of this range were. In this case, the term "about" in said claim was not clear, again contrary to what was required by Art. 84 EPC.

The patent proprietor had submitted that the term "about" was clear in light of the description of the patent since paragraph [0020] gave a clear definition of the term. According to the board, the claims have to be clear as such, i.e. without taking the description into account to interpret any unclear term. Even if it were accepted that the description could be consulted in the context of Art. 84 EPC, paragraph [0020] of the patent read as follows: "[...], the term "about" means within a statistically meaningful range of a value, such as a stated concentration range, time frame, molecular weight, particle size, temperature or pH. Such a range can be within an order of magnitude, typically within 20%, more typically within 10%, and even more typically within 5% of the indicated value or range". In the board's view, the term "statistically meaningful range" did not clearly define a range and for that reason was unclear. Even if it were accepted that, as submitted by the patent proprietor, the term "statistically meaningful range" was specified by relative variations in percent, said term would still be unclear since the following sentence contained various different percentages ("typically within 20%, more typically within 10%, and even more typically within 5% of the indicated value or range"). Contrary to the patent proprietor's submission that the skilled person would choose the broadest range, there was no teaching in this following sentence to choose the percentage within 20% of the indicated value, in view of the lower preference of the term "typically" compared with the two other terms "more typically" and "even more typically".

The patent proprietor further submitted that the term "about" was to be considered clear in light of the Guidelines F-IV, 4.7.1 – March 2021 version. The board pointed out that this chapter related to the interpretation of terms such as "about", not to the assessment of the clarity of such terms. Thus, the board found that the patent proprietor's submission was not convincing.