2.4.3 Marking the EQE answer papers consistently

On the principle of consistency of marking (Art. 6(2)(c) REE; cf. Art. 16 REE 1994, English version, "uniformity of marking"), the board in D 4/99 stated that the appellant's starting point, namely that in case of non-identical marks by the two examiners only one value could be the correct one, was irreconcilable with the fact that marking was an individual assessment of the candidate's work. Rather, more or less strict standards were possible and different aspects might be considered essential or less important even within the general instructions for marking contained in the IPREE 1994. Examiners must have some latitude of evaluation when awarding marks and individual examiners might arrive at different marks, both results being justifiable. Therefore, differences in marking did not violate the REE 1994 and its IPREE (D 5/94, D 6/98). In order to safeguard the principle of equal treatment, harmonisation of marking was provided for in the marking sheets. If the marking was different, the two examiners might revise their marks on the basis of a discussion between them. The examination committee recommended the grade, and the Examination Board adopted it or otherwise, in full knowledge of the different marks awarded by the two examiners. This system ensured uniformity of marking (Art. 16 REE 1994; D 12/82, OJ 1983, 233).

The following decisions confirmed this approach. According to D 6/99, small differences in marking were an unavoidable consequence of Art. 8(b) REE 1994. The board was not aware of any provision supporting the submission that in such cases only the better mark awarded in each category of the paper should be counted. In D 12/00 the board rejected the appellant's claim that any discrepancy between the markings of each examiner showed gross disregard for the principle of uniformity within the meaning of Art. 16 REE 1994. Confirming the principles of its established case law (cf. D 1/92, OJ 1993, 357, reported in this chapter V.C.2.6.3; see also D 4/99 above), the board held that differences of opinion over the number of marks to be awarded for a given answer were a reflection of value judgments which were not, in principle, subject to judicial review. And in D 3/00 (OJ 2003, 365), which concerned Paper D, the board held that a candidate was not per se entitled to claim the highest mark awarded by one of the examiners for each answer to a sub-question or sub-element.

In D 10/02 (OJ 2003, 275) the DBA noted that neither the REE 1994 nor its IPREE regulated the procedure to follow in the exceptional cases where a committee was unable to agree on the marking; nor did they provide for calling in an additional examiner. Hence the appointment of a third examiner without any basis in the REE 1994 or its IPREE had to be deemed a substantial procedural violation.