E. Re-establishment of rights
Overview
T 1882/23 × View decision
Abstract
In the decision under appeal in T 1882/23, the examining division had rejected the applicant's request for re-establishment of rights in respect of the time limit for paying the renewal fee for the fourth year and the additional fee, and deemed the patent application to be withdrawn. The examining division considered the request to be inadmissible because it was not filed within two months of the removal of the cause of non-compliance within the meaning of R. 136(1), first sentence, EPC.
The board recalled that the removal of the cause of non-compliance is to be established on a purely factual basis. It occurred, as a rule, on the date on which the person responsible for the application vis-à-vis the EPO became aware of the fact that a time limit had not been observed. This awareness was typically the result of the actual receipt of a communication of loss of rights under R. 112(1) EPC (see T 231/23, J 1/20). This had not been disputed by the appellant.
The appellant argued that, in the present case, the person responsible for the application vis-à-vis the EPO should be the person employed by the appellant to manage its patent portfolio (the "IP person"). It argued that this person's awareness had to be decisive, and not that of the professional representative. According to the appellant, the present circumstances illustrated the problems associated with a "hybrid" system, where the representative was not fully responsible for all actions relating to the application, but where other persons, in this case the in-house IP person, were responsible for the patent portfolio and for managing the payment of renewal fees. The appellant stressed that the authorised firm of representatives had been specifically told that they were not responsible for paying the renewal fees.
The board did not find these arguments convincing. The question of who was responsible for which task within the appellant's sphere of responsibility could not be decisive for the issue of determining the point in time when the cause of non-compliance with the period was removed. Legal certainty required that the starting point be clearly and objectively determined. This could not depend on the circumstances of how the appellant had organised its tasks and representation, whether internally or with the help of external providers.
The board referred to the current case law on this matter and observed that, where a professional representative was appointed, it was that representative who was the "person responsible for the application vis-à-vis the EPO" (cf. J 1/20). The professional representative remained the person whose awareness was relevant for assessing when the cause of non-compliance with the period was removed, irrespective of whether a third party other than the representative was responsible for the payment of fees (J 27/90). As such, regardless of the contractual arrangements made by the appellant for the payment of fees, the appointed professional representative remained the EPO's single point of contact (T 231/23). If the appointed professional representative received a communication of loss of rights due to the non-payment of fees, the cause of non-compliance with the period was removed pursuant to R. 136(1), first sentence, EPC on the date of that actual receipt. This was also true where, as in the present case, that representative had been instructed by their client that all renewal matters would be handled by others. According to the board, such an instruction alone was not a reason for the cause of non-compliance to persist despite the appointed professional representative's actual awareness of the non-compliance (T 231/23). Thus, in the case in hand, it was irrelevant whether, and on which date, the appellant's "IP person" received the notice of loss of rights.
The appellant also sought to rely on T 942/12. However, the board did not find this decision relevant to the question at hand. According to the board, the findings in T 942/12 concerned solely the question of whether the representative had exercised "all due care", i.e. the merits of the request for re-establishment of rights. In contrast, the question in the case at hand related to the person whose awareness was relevant for the removal of the cause of non-compliance. This question was independent of the question of whether all due care was taken.
The professional representative had received the notice of loss of rights on 4 June 2019. The removal of the cause of non-compliance with the period thus occurred on that date. The request for re-establishment of rights was filed on 10 September 2019, i.e. it was not filed within the two-month time limit laid down in R. 136(1), first sentence, EPC. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
T 178/23 × View decision
Abstract
In T 178/23 the appellant requested re-establishment of rights under Art. 122 EPC in relation to the non-observance of the time limits under Art. 108 EPC for filing the notice of appeal and paying the appeal fee, and for filing the statement of grounds of appeal.
As regards the admissibility of the request for re-establishment of rights, the board observed that, since the appellant had missed two different time limits, it could be argued that each of the two time limits, which expired independently of one another, had to be considered separately, notwithstanding the fact that they were triggered by the same event (see J 26/95, T 2017/12). In this case, the appellant's request for re-establishment would be inadmissible because it paid only one re-establishment fee within the two-month time limit under R. 136(1) EPC. However, there was also case law in which one fee was considered sufficient because re-establishment in respect of both periods had to be examined together and the result would inevitably be the same (see T 315/87, J 7/16, T 1823/16). In the board's view, the question of whether one or two re-establishment fees were required could be left undecided in the case in hand.
Regarding the substantiation of the request for re-establishment of rights, the board found that in the letter requesting re-establishment of rights, the appellant had not presented any core facts to make it possible for the board to consider whether the appellant had taken all due care required by the circumstances in order to comply with the time limits under Art. 108 EPC. Rather, the appellant had merely stated that it had failed to observe the time limits despite exercising all due care, without setting out any concrete facts demonstrating that it had taken all the due care required by the circumstances. The mere statement that it "could not be reasonably expected" that the drawings would be missing in the examining division's communication under R. 71(3) EPC was not sufficient in this regard. It was only with the letter of reply to the board's communication that the appellant went into more detail for the first time on possible facts regarding whether the appellant had taken all due care required by the circumstances. According to the board, the appellant had not merely adduced further evidence clarifying the facts which had already been set out in due time, but had (belatedly) attempted to make a conclusive case. Therefore, the new submissions in the letter of reply were not to be taken into account. Consequently, the request for re-establishment of rights was found inadmissible for lack of substantiation.
The board then moved on to the issue of inability to observe a time limit vis-à-vis the EPO. It noted that according to established case law the word "unable" in Art. 122(1) EPC implied an objective fact or obstacle preventing the required action, e.g. a wrong date inadvertently being entered into a monitoring system.
In the case in hand, the board could not see any objective fact or obstacle that prevented the appellant from observing the time limits under Art. 108 EPC. The facts relied on by the appellant did not relate to an error in the carrying out of a party's actual intention to meet a specific time limit, but only to an error in relation to the intention to use a legal remedy entailing a time limit. The appellant was able to file an appeal in due time but failed to do so because of a previous error as to motive, i.e. because it was unaware of the need to file an appeal to rectify the absence of the drawings in the patent specification. According to the board, this situation differed from those governed by Art. 122 EPC where a party did intend to observe a time limit but failed to do so due to objective obstacles.
Consequently, the board found that the appellant's request for re-establishment of rights was also inadmissible on the ground that the appellant was not unable to observe the time limits under Art. 108 EPC. In view of the considerations above, whether the appellant had complied with the "all due care" criterion under Art. 122(1) EPC was irrelevant. The request for re-establishment of rights was thus refused as inadmissible and the appeal was deemed not to have been filed.
E. Re-establishment of rights
2.Right to file request for re-establishment of rights
3.Non-observance of time limit directly causing a loss of right
4.Admissibility of requests for re-establishment of rights
5.Merit of request for re-establishment of rights
6.Procedural treatment of requests for re-establishment
9.Reimbursement of the fee for re-establishment