A. The principle of the protection of legitimate expectations
Overview
T 1946/21 × View decision
Catchword:
1. For the question of whether the applicant is "successor in title" within the meaning of Article 87(1) EPC, it is sufficient for the applicant or patent proprietor to demonstrate that the assignment of the priority right was effective before the subsequent application was filed. The law does not set forth any other condition. In particular, the assignment need not be effective before the filing date of the subsequent application. (see point 2.3). 2. In the context of in-person oral proceedings, a request of a party for a hybrid format to allow the representatives to attend the hearing in person and other attendees to attend remotely should normally be granted only if the participation of the person for whom the access by means of videoconferencing technology has been requested is related to a person whose participation in the oral proceedings is relevant to the case, in particular to the decision to be taken at the oral proceedings (see point 1.).
J 3/24 × View decision
Abstract
In J 3/24 the examination and designation fees (due on Friday, 10 February 2023) had been paid too late (on Monday, 13 February 2023). By letter of 12 February 2023, the appellant's representative had requested that the payment be considered as made on time, as he had wrongly assumed that he had given an automatic debit order. On 21 February 2023, a notification of loss of rights had been sent undated, and had been sent again on 7 March 2023 (together, the "Notification") informing the appellant that the application had been deemed to be withdrawn due to the late payment. The Notification indicated as available means of redress a request for further processing under Art. 121 EPC and a request to consider the fee to have been paid on time under Art. 7(3), 7(4) RFees, each within a two-month time limit for filing. No valid request for further processing had been filed during that time.
The appellant argued that the fact that the Receiving Section had not replied to his letter of 12 February 2023 and had wrongly stated that a reply had been given with the Notification constituted a substantial procedural violation. He requested reimbursement of the appeal fee.
The Legal Board did not consider that the requirements in R. 103(1)(a) EPC were met in the present case. It recalled that according to the established case law of the Boards of Appeal, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations (also referred to as the principle of good faith) requires communications addressed to applicants to be clear and unambiguous, i.e. drafted in such a way as to rule out misunderstandings on the part of a reasonable addressee. An applicant must not suffer a disadvantage as a result of having relied on a misleading communication (see G 2/97, J 2/87, J 3/87, J 4/23, T 2092/13). If a communication is not as clear and unambiguous as it should be and misleads a reasonable recipient, this may constitute a substantial procedural violation and entitle the appellant to reimbursement of the appeal fee (see J 3/87). On the other hand, both the EPO and users of the European patent system who are parties to proceedings before it are obliged to act in good faith. The principle of the protection of legitimate expectations does not give carte blanche to the person relying on it (J 4/23). It is the responsibility of users of the European patent system to take all necessary procedural actions to avoid a loss of rights (see G 2/97, R 4/09). It is also inherent in the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations that a person can only successfully invoke an expectation on which they could, on an objective basis, legitimately rely. The erroneous information from the EPO must objectively justify their conduct (see J 4/23; G 2/97). Thus it must be established that, on an objective basis and in the circumstances of the case, it was reasonable for the appellant to have been misled by the information on which they relied (see J 4/23, J 27/92, G 2/97).
The Legal Board acknowledged that the Notification made reference to the late payment but did not expressly address the request of 12 February 2023 for the late payment to be considered as having been made on time. It was therefore not clearly apparent whether the Receiving Section had taken this request into account in the Notification. However, it was not reasonable for the appellant to completely disregard the Notification. Even if the appellant's representative had considered the Notification as having been generated automatically without taking into account the request of 12 February 2023, it was expected that communications from the EPO would be observed. The Notification pointed out the legal remedies available to overcome the loss of rights caused by the late payment and indicated the time limit for filing a request for further processing. Such an official communication could not simply be ignored and set aside. Rather, it was the appellant's own responsibility to enquire about the situation regarding his request before expiry of the triggered time limits to ensure that he did not suffer any loss of rights. The fact that he only contacted the Receiving Section on 1 June 2023 had to be attributed solely to him. The Legal Board reiterated that it was the responsibility of users of the European patent system to take all necessary procedural actions to avoid a loss of rights. This applied all the more in the case at hand as the matter was initially set in motion by an error on the part of the appellant's representative. Moreover, even if a substantial procedural error were to be assumed – which could not be recognised here – reimbursement of the appeal fee would not be equitable within the meaning of R. 103(1)(a) EPC, since the behaviour of the appellant had contributed to the situation.
The request for reimbursement of the appeal fee was refused.
T 2053/20 × View decision
Abstract
In T 2053/20 war unstreitig, dass die Beschwerdeführerin (Einsprechende) in der Beschwerdeschrift vom 18. Dezember 2020 und dem entsprechenden Begleitschreiben ihre Absicht zum Ausdruck gebracht hatte, die Beschwerdegebühr zu bezahlen. Die dafür eingeschlagenen Wege, nämlich der automatische Abbuchungsauftrag einerseits und die nicht im korrekten elektronischen Format erteilte Einzugsermächtigung vom laufenden Konto andererseits, waren unter den Bestimmungen der ab dem 1. Oktober 2019 gültigen Vorschriften über das laufende Konto (VLK 2019) und deren Anhängen zur Zahlung der Beschwerdegebühr nicht zulässig. Das automatische Abbuchungsverfahren steht nur Anmeldern, Patentinhabern und ihren Vertretern offen, nicht aber Einsprechenden (s. Nummer 1.3 der Regeln über das automatische Abbuchungsverfahren). Siehe auch Nummer 5.1.2 VLK 2019 zu zulässigen Wegen der Einreichung eines Abbuchungsauftrags. Im Ergebnis erfolgte keine Abbuchung der Beschwerdegebühr innerhalb der in Art. 108 EPÜ vorgeschriebenen Frist von zwei Monaten. Allerdings unterblieb die entsprechende in den VLK eigentlich vorgesehene Mitteilung des EPA über die Nichtausführung der Zahlungsaufforderung (Nummer 5.1.3 VLK 2019).
Nach Ansicht der Kammer, hätte eine solche Mitteilung möglicherweise zur rechtzeitigen Zahlung der Beschwerdegebühr geführt, da die entsprechende Zweimonatsfrist erst am 7. Januar 2021 endete.
Die Kammer stellte fest, dass das EPA in früheren Fällen der Beschwerdeführerin eine Zahlung von Gebühren unter Berufung auf das automatische Abbuchungsverfahren auch in Situationen kommentarlos akzeptiert und die Beschwerdegebühr vom laufenden Konto der Beschwerdeführerin abgebucht hatte, in denen diese als Einsprechende auftrat, obwohl dies nicht den geltenden Regularien entsprach. Eine entsprechende Änderung der Praxis des EPA wurde der Beschwerdeführerin auch nicht zur Kenntnis gebracht.
Die Kammer gewährte daher der Einsprechenden Vertrauensschutz. In Ermangelung einer entsprechenden Mitteilung des EPA konnte die Beschwerdeführerin unter den gegebenen Umständen davon ausgehen, dass ihre am 18. Dezember 2020 getätigten Zahlungsanweisungen zur Abbuchung der Beschwerdegebühr akzeptiert und ausgeführt worden waren. Dass dem nicht so war, erfuhr sie erst durch den Bescheid der Kammer vom 21. September 2023. Die Zahlung der Beschwerdegebühr erfolgte daraufhin innerhalb der von der Kammer gesetzten Frist.
Die Kammer kam zu dem Schluss, dass die am 18. Januar 2024 vorgenommene Zahlung der Beschwerdegebühr mit Wirkung zum 18. Dezember 2020 erfolgt war. Daher wurde die Beschwerdegebühr in der von Art. 108 EPÜ vorgesehenen Zweimonatsfrist nach Zustellung der angefochtenen Entscheidung bezahlt.
Die Beschwerde wurde daher gemäß Art. 108 EPÜ form- und fristgerecht eingelegt.