4.2. Examples of cases addressing the obligation to draw attention to easily remediable deficiencies
4.2.2 Missing or insufficient fee payments
J 2/94 involved a letter comprising a request for re-establishment without the necessary payment. According to the board the appellant could not have expected to be informed of the missing fee immediately after receipt of his request for re-establishment by the EPO. There had been no evident indication in the appellant's submission which made a clarification or reminder necessary. Indeed, the EPO could, in practice, often establish whether a specific fee had been paid only after the relevant time limit had expired, once the complete data on all payments made during that period was available (see also T 1815/15).
In G 2/97 (OJ 1999, 123) the Enlarged Board of Appeal held that the principle of good faith did not impose any obligation on the boards of appeal to notify an appellant that an appeal fee was missing when the notice of appeal was filed so early that the appellant could react and pay the fee in time, if there was no indication – either in the notice of appeal or in any other document filed in relation to the appeal – from which it could be inferred that the appellant would, without such notification, inadvertently miss the time-limit for payment of the appeal fee.
Prior to G 2/97, the boards had held in a number of decisions that the EPO had a duty to warn the parties of missing or insufficient fee payments. These included T 14/89 (OJ 1990, 432), J 13/90 (OJ 1994, 456), J 15/90 of 28 November 1994 date: 1994-11-28 and T 923/95. The Enlarged Board held with regard to T 14/89 that the case turned on its particular facts and that there was no generally applicable principle to be derived therefrom. The board in T 642/12 suggested that the approach in T 923/95 was no longer tenable as it plainly contradicted the findings of G 2/97.
In T 296/96, only 50% of the appeal fee was paid before the expiry of the time limit under Art. 108, first sentence, EPC 1973. However, since the formalities officer invited the appellant to pay the remainder of the appeal fee and accepted its subsequent payment without comment, the appellant could assume in all good faith that the appeal was deemed to have been filed (Art. 108, second sentence, EPC 1973) and that, as a consequence, it was not necessary to file a request for re-establishment. The appellant, who was misled by the action of the formalities officer, must, in accordance with the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, be treated as having paid the appeal fee in time.
In T 161/96 (OJ 1999, 331) the board came to the conclusion that there was no basis for assuming an obligation on the part of the EPO to warn the party of an impeding loss of rights relating to an underpayment of 40% of the opposition fee.
In T 445/98 the board considered that, because the department which cashed the fee was not the same as the one which received the notice of appeal, the deficiency was not easy to identify and the time between payment of the appeal fee and expiry of the non-observed two-month time limit for filing the notice of appeal was too short, so that the opponent could not expect a warning.
In T 642/12 the board held that a potential possibility of discovering the error (80% instead of 100% of the appeal fee had been paid) was not sufficient to establish the legitimate expectation that a registrar of the boards of appeal would warn an appellant within seven working days before the expiry of the time limit that a reduced appeal fee had been relied on in error. The appeal fee was thus deemed not to have been paid (but see T 595/11 in this chapter III.A.2.2.3). See also T 2422/18 and T 1060/19 on payment of a reduced fee by persons not fulfilling the criteria of the relevant notice from the EPO dated 18 December 2017 (OJ 2018, A5).
In T 703/19 the board considered that EPO users could legitimately expect a plausibility check to be carried out on the filing of an appeal. On filing its notice of appeal, the appellant had stated in it that the appeal fee had thereby been paid via the Online Fee Payment service. The letter accompanying subsequently filed items, however, contained information on the kind of fees and the amount payable but nothing on the method of payment, for which "not specified" appeared. The bank account number was missing too. The board considered that this lack of information was clearly at odds with the stated intention of paying the appeal fee on filing notice of appeal. The deficiency had at any rate been readily identifiable as both the accompanying letter and the notice of appeal had contained very little information.
- T 2053/20
Abstract
In T 2053/20 war unstreitig, dass die Beschwerdeführerin (Einsprechende) in der Beschwerdeschrift vom 18. Dezember 2020 und dem entsprechenden Begleitschreiben ihre Absicht zum Ausdruck gebracht hatte, die Beschwerdegebühr zu bezahlen. Die dafür eingeschlagenen Wege, nämlich der automatische Abbuchungsauftrag einerseits und die nicht im korrekten elektronischen Format erteilte Einzugsermächtigung vom laufenden Konto andererseits, waren unter den Bestimmungen der ab dem 1. Oktober 2019 gültigen Vorschriften über das laufende Konto (VLK 2019) und deren Anhängen zur Zahlung der Beschwerdegebühr nicht zulässig. Das automatische Abbuchungsverfahren steht nur Anmeldern, Patentinhabern und ihren Vertretern offen, nicht aber Einsprechenden (s. Nummer 1.3 der Regeln über das automatische Abbuchungsverfahren). Siehe auch Nummer 5.1.2 VLK 2019 zu zulässigen Wegen der Einreichung eines Abbuchungsauftrags. Im Ergebnis erfolgte keine Abbuchung der Beschwerdegebühr innerhalb der in Art. 108 EPÜ vorgeschriebenen Frist von zwei Monaten. Allerdings unterblieb die entsprechende in den VLK eigentlich vorgesehene Mitteilung des EPA über die Nichtausführung der Zahlungsaufforderung (Nummer 5.1.3 VLK 2019).
Nach Ansicht der Kammer, hätte eine solche Mitteilung möglicherweise zur rechtzeitigen Zahlung der Beschwerdegebühr geführt, da die entsprechende Zweimonatsfrist erst am 7. Januar 2021 endete.
Die Kammer stellte fest, dass das EPA in früheren Fällen der Beschwerdeführerin eine Zahlung von Gebühren unter Berufung auf das automatische Abbuchungsverfahren auch in Situationen kommentarlos akzeptiert und die Beschwerdegebühr vom laufenden Konto der Beschwerdeführerin abgebucht hatte, in denen diese als Einsprechende auftrat, obwohl dies nicht den geltenden Regularien entsprach. Eine entsprechende Änderung der Praxis des EPA wurde der Beschwerdeführerin auch nicht zur Kenntnis gebracht.
Die Kammer gewährte daher der Einsprechenden Vertrauensschutz. In Ermangelung einer entsprechenden Mitteilung des EPA konnte die Beschwerdeführerin unter den gegebenen Umständen davon ausgehen, dass ihre am 18. Dezember 2020 getätigten Zahlungsanweisungen zur Abbuchung der Beschwerdegebühr akzeptiert und ausgeführt worden waren. Dass dem nicht so war, erfuhr sie erst durch den Bescheid der Kammer vom 21. September 2023. Die Zahlung der Beschwerdegebühr erfolgte daraufhin innerhalb der von der Kammer gesetzten Frist.
Die Kammer kam zu dem Schluss, dass die am 18. Januar 2024 vorgenommene Zahlung der Beschwerdegebühr mit Wirkung zum 18. Dezember 2020 erfolgt war. Daher wurde die Beschwerdegebühr in der von Art. 108 EPÜ vorgesehenen Zweimonatsfrist nach Zustellung der angefochtenen Entscheidung bezahlt.
Die Beschwerde wurde daher gemäß Art. 108 EPÜ form- und fristgerecht eingelegt.