6.3. Discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods
This section has been updated to reflect case law and legislative changes up to 31 December 2023. For the previous version of this section please refer to the "Case Law of the Boards of Appeal", 10th edition (PDF). |
If a new property of a known material or article is found out, that is mere discovery and unpatentable because discovery as such has no technical effect and is therefore not an invention within the meaning of Art. 52(1) EPC. If, however, that property is put to practical use, then this constitutes an invention which may be patentable. To find a previously unrecognised substance occurring in nature is also mere discovery and therefore unpatentable. However, if a substance found in nature can be shown to produce a technical effect, it may be patentable. In addition, if a microorganism is discovered to exist in nature and to produce an antibiotic, the microorganism itself may also be patentable as one aspect of the invention. Similarly, a gene which is discovered to exist in nature may be patentable if a technical effect is revealed, e.g. its use in making a certain polypeptide or in gene therapy (Guidelines G‑II, 3.1 – March 2024 version).
It was recognised in T 208/84 (OJ 1987, 14) that the fact that the idea or concept underlying the claimed subject-matter resides in a discovery does not necessarily mean that the claimed subject-matter is a discovery "as such" (G 2/88, OJ 1990, 93).
In T 1538/05 the appellant claimed to have discovered a magnetic force that was hitherto unknown, and as a consequence thereof, established that theories such as the Heisenberg uncertainty principle as well as Einstein's theory of relativity were wrong. These were scientific theories or discoveries of the laws of nature different from those established. The board was in no position to determine whether these physical theories and discoveries were correct or not. Neither the claims, nor the description gave any indication of a clear technical teaching. It was clear to the board that the subject-matter claimed by the appellant was not patentable, as the appellant had not demonstrated that they were of a technical nature and that the invention could be applied to processes or devices.
In T 2079/10 the invention was seen to lie in the improvement of the measurement technique itself, which involved technical considerations about the sensors and their positions. In the case in hand, the measurements themselves did not play a role; the improvement was in the processing of data to provide a better weather forecast. The applicant's argument was essentially that an improvement in the weather data by calculating and further processing it was also technical. In the board's view this led to the key issue in this case, namely whether improving the accuracy of given data of a weather forecast was technical. If it was not, then the details of the algorithm, the "mathematics" as the division put it, do not help. The board held that it was not. The "weather" is not a technical system that the skilled person can improve, or even simulate with the purpose of trying to improve it. It is a physical system that can be modelled in the sense of showing how it works. This kind of modelling is rather a discovery or a scientific theory, both of which are excluded from patentability under Art. 52(2)(a) EPC and thus cannot contribute to the technical character of the invention (see also T 2331/10).